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By letter of 25 May 1973 the Bureau of the European parliament auth-
orized the Political Affairs committee to draw up an own initiativ€ report
on the polrers of the European parliament.
At its meeting of 18 lray 1973 the Political Affairs committee appointed
Sir Peter KrRK rapporteur. rt considered his draft report at meetings in
1975 and 1976.
On 22 June 1975 the committee decided to consider this matter in the
form of two motions for resolution, one on the internal procedureg of the
Eurotr-an Parliament and the other on inter-institutional relations.
At its meeting
rapporteur in place
of
of
23 Septemlcer J-977 the committee appointed Lord REAy
Sir Peter Kirk.
The committee considered the present motion for a resolution on inter-
institutional relations at its meetings of 2I and 22 Novcmber Lg77, 2 and
3 February 1978, 20 and 21 April 1978 and lg and 19 },tay r97B and at the
raat meeting adopted it with three votes against and one abstention.
Present: Mr Bertrand, chairrnan; Mr Johnston, viee-chairman; Lord !ggy,
rapporteur; I{r Berkhouwer, Mr de la l,laIdne, Ivlr Faure, l,[r ],titchelr,
ILlr Pregcott, l.!r B.EE, Mr seefeld, lilr sieqlerschmidt, Ir{r Verqeer and
!!r Zaqari.
The explanatory statement will be presented orally in plenary sitting.
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AThe PoIit-icaI Affairs Committee herel>y eubmite to the Europcen
Parliament the following motion for a resolution:
I{O{TION FOR A RESOLUIION
on inter-institutional relations
@,
- 
considering Lhe undertaking given by the Heads of Goverrunent at Paris
in December L974 that : 'The competence of the EuroPean Assembly will
be extended, in particular by granting it certain Pohters in the
Conununities' legislative Process|,
- 
considering Lhe need to attain an effective balance between the
institutions of the ComnunJ-ties ,
- 
welcoming the progress already made, over recent years, in the
development of closer links between the council and Parllamen€, and
the Commission and Parlialent ,
- 
having regard to the report of the Political Affairs Committee (Doc. L48/781 
'
A. REI,ATIONS WITH COMMUNITY INSTITUTIONS
Relations with the European Council
I. Requests the President of the European Council to rnake a statement to
Parliament concerning its work and conclusions once drring each
Presidency, and t,o reply to questions Put to him by lilembers of
Parliament ;
2. Considers that the annual debate on the General Report of the ConunisEion
may be accompanied by an annual debate on the state of the Union and the.
'--unctioning of the institutions, in which the President of the European i
council would participate and in which the other members of the
European Council and the Foreign Ministers of the Member States would be
invited to take part ;
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3.
4.
Relations with the Council
Requests the Council to inform Parliament of its reasons each time it
takes a decision which deviates from Parliament's Opinion concerning
1Community instruments having financial implications and ,all
mat,ters of special importance'2
Requests the Council to agree :
(h) that the use of the conciliation procedure, as laid dorn by the
declaration of 4 llarch 1975, should be extended to proposals
of the Commissionwhich Parliament considers to be of particular
importance and concerning which, when expressing its opinion, it
has asked that this procedure be applicable ;
(b) that. it should meet together with a delegation of parlLament, at
Parliament's request, whenever Parliament considers that Council
has not taken sufficiently rapid decisions on proposals submitted
to the Council which Parliament considers to be of exceptional
importance ;
(c) ttrat its President-in-office and the Presidents of the specialized
Councils should continue to develop the existing practice of
appearing before the relevant corunittees of Parliament to explain
and define Council's views and to engage in a dialogue concerning
them ;
5. Requests the Council to consult, Parliarnent concerning all Acts not
defined in Article I89 of the EEc Treaty or elsewhere in the Treaties
Relations with t,he Commission
6. Requests the national governments to agree that Parliament Ehould be
granted the power to confirm the nomination of the president and
It{embers of the Commission ;
7. considers that. Parriament, forrowing appropriate consultations with
the Corunission, may request the Cornnrission to undertake any studies
which Parliarent considers desirabre for the attainment of thg--
common objectives ;
see letter addressed to l,lr scerba, then president of parlLamant,by l,1r Harmel, then President-in-Office of the Council, of 20.3.1920.
See lettser addressed to Mr Scelba, then president of parllemcnt,by Mr Sc:heel, then President-in-Office of the Council, of 22.7.i97O.
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8. Considers that the Commission should, regularly, submit, a written report
to Parliament setti.nq out fult details of the aetion it hae taken in
im;rlcmenE,lng reeoJ.uLlonn irnd ro;:orLs of l,arli r.:rn€nl- ;
9. Suggests that the Commission should attach to the prelimlnary draft budgct
a memorandum, sett,ing out the detaits of European InveEtment Bank loans ;
B. IMPIJMENTING PROVISIONS
10. Charges the Political AffairE Committee to trmraue its studi€B con-
cerning inter-institutional rerations, mor€ eetrrciarly on thc n€€d
for the European parriament to be consulted by the counill on
applications for accession by new Member States, improvements
that might be made to the Luns/westerterp procedure, and the
organization of hearings by Parliament,s committees, and to report
back to the European parliament i
11. lnstructs its President to fornard this resolution together with
the report of its corunittee to the Council and Commission of the
European Corununities and to the Parliaments and Governments of the
l,tember States.
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BEXPIATBE ORY MEMORAIIDUM
l. Comm€nts accompanying the motion for a reEolution on inter-j.nstitu-
tional relations will be presented to Parliament orally by your rapPorteur.
2. your rapporteur wiehes to draw attention to Ann€x I, which consistg
of the draft report by th€ late Sir Pet€r Kirk on Powora of the EuroPGan
parliament. Slr Peter's report had been the subject of eeveral discuseiong
in the political AffairE Committee, and the committee rdaa about to hold
votes on two draft resolutions submitted by Sir Peter at the time of hiE
death.
3. DLfferences of substance and emphasis between the PreEent motion for
a resolutlon and the proposals nade in Sir Peter Kirkts report are due to
institutional developments which have intervened and to rnodlfLcatlone
introduced by the Political Affairs Committee.
4. your rapporteur wishes to pay tribute to the work carried qtt by the
late Sir peter Kirk concerning the developnent of Parliament'e role in
inter-institutional relations .
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RePort
by the late Sir P€t€r Kirk
on
Powers of the Parliament
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I
INTRODUCTION
I. In June 1953 t'[r Hang Furler presented a report to Parliament, on
behalf of t,he Politica1 Committee, on the "Competences and Powers of the
European Parliament" (Ooc.3l/53). In the preaent report on I'Powers of
the Parliament" your Rapporteur does not try to emulate the remarkable
analyeis made by Mr Furler of the baeis of the pot^rers and competenceg of
ParIiamenE, which stilI remalns valid, deapite subsequent devclopmentB.
2. The present text is the second stage of an operation in which your
Rapporteur has already, in October L973, seL out his detailed considerations
concerning the strengthening of the budgetary powers of Parliament in the
form of an Opinion, presented on behalf of the Politica1 Affairs Committee,
on the Report presented by !4r Spdnale, Chairman and Rapporteur of the
Committee on Budgets, on the strengthening of Parliament's budgetary
poxrera (pn::.89O). Some of the proposals made by Mr Sp€na1e and your
Rapporteur at that time have already come into operation, notably the
ueoncertation" procedure.
3. In the present document (which fits into a pattern of paralleI reports
whieh are in progresg in the Political Affaire Commlttee or which have
already been adopted by the Committce or by it and Parllament - notably
thoae of Mr Bertrand on fluropean Union, Mr Lenihan on Political Union,
Mr Jahn on Relations with National Parliaments, Mr Patijn on Direct
Elections and Lord cladtr:/n on the Effects of a European Foreign Policy on
Defence Questions) your Rapporteur adopts a pragrmatsie rather than an
academic approach to the question of how Parliament's powers might be
strengthened. In the first place he does not base his proposals on the
position which Parliament "ought" or "shou1d" occupy within the institutional
framework of +-he European Communities and their decision-making process.
He takes as his point of departure the position of Parliament as it seems
to him to exist today and tries to concentrate on presenting a limited
number of specific propoeals aimed at increasing the pohrers of Parliament
in the near future. In doing so he doee not reject or question those
long-term increases in Parliament's powers which are envigaged by some
parliamentariang and academic commentators. He merely wisheg to eubmit
to l'arliament a number of suggeaLiorrs which, if implement-ed, mtght, in r hc
PresenE state of t.he Communities, have some chance of winning aeceptrnce.
In the budgetary field the proposals that are made could, if Parliament
were to agree to them, be implemented (so long as the Commission proved
cooperative) and lead to a substantial increase in Parliament's poreers and
influence without the Council having to take any decision.
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4. It is sometimes argued that no significant increase in Parliament,s
pohrers can be achieved without the precondition of direct elections.
your Rapporteur rejecte this view and in doing so he wi:hes to guote one
of the conclusionE of the "Vede1 Report" which stated: "The Bystem of the
precondition becauee of a logical trap leadB to a vieious circle for if
one cannot imagine a Parliament with real powers which does not draw its
mandat.e from direct universal suffrage, it is even more difficult to
lmagtne the election through direct universal suffrage of a Parliament
without extended polvera. In this way, two equally desirable objectives
are making each other's implementation impoesible. The only way to
break the vicious circle iE to refuse to let one of the two objectives
depend on the achievement of the other first. Nelther has priority over
the other, nor is their simultaneous achievement necessary. If any
logical links exiet between them, these are expressed in the fact t.hat
any progress made towardE the achievement of one will be a step towarde
the achievement of the other." The adoption of the Patijn propoaals by
Parliament, in January l9?5, and the hope expressed in the Paris Sunurit
comrnuniquG of Deeember 1974 that direct elections could take place ae early
as 1978 underline the need for Parliament to move forr*ard rapidly in
increaaing, or obtaining increases In, its powers.
Contents of Report
5. In Chapter II your Rapport,eur examines,the types of decision
theoretically provided for in the Treaties of Paris and Rome and compares
them with the system of decision-making which has grown up in the
Corununities in reality. Your Rapporteur draws attention to some of the
problems posed by these nev, "extra-Treaty" or "parallel" decision-making
procedures and raises some questions concernlng then. Chapter IIf
exardree the relationship of Parliament to the Commieeion ard the Council.
Chapter Iv is concerned with Budgetary Control. Chapter v makes proposals
coneerning Parliament's relations with the Court of Juetice, the Court
of Auditora and Regional Policy bodies. Chapter vf on llxternal Relationa
makeg proposals by which Ehe significance of Parliament,s role in the
negotiation of aesociation and comrnercial agreements could be increaged.
Chapter VII examines the posaibility of increasing the scope for Parliament'E
control concerning the development of foreign policy and defence cooperation
by the Nine and concerning economic and monetary union. Chapter VfII
gumnarisee the propoeals made in thie Report.
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G. The types of decteion which can be taken by Communlty inBt,itutions are
defined ln Articles 189-192 of lhe EEC Tretty. Your Rapporteur does not
consider it necessary to e:<plain, here, the nature of decisiong, regulations,
directives and opinions. This is well known, as ie the role played by
parliament in the decision-making procesa of the European Comnunities.
7. fn this chapter your Rapporteur ahows hotr, over the yeara: (a) new
types of decision, not provided for in the Treatiea, have been developed
by the Dtember Governments alongside Treaty-baaed formB, and; (b) new
bodies have been created by governmenta which operate on 3n "informal"
or ,'parallel" basl-8 taking deciaions which effectively conmlt the Nine
outside the inetitutions of the Communitiea and outgide the provieions of
the Treatlea. In moat cases neither these decisione nor theee bodies
are reaponeible to, or subject to control by Parliament. In all this
amounta to an "extra-Treaty" form of intergovernmental cooperation.
Chanqes in roles of Council and Commission
8. At the same time that theee practices have been developed the role
of the Comrnission has diminished (1) and the Council has become the
dominant inetitution in the Communities.
<). C)ver and above the tranrbrmation of the insti.tutional balance
brought about by the changes of emphaais in the EDC and [:uratom Treaties
- 
confirmed in the Merger Treaty - the decline of the Commission (despite
its continuing strong technical influence) has cont.inued. This decline
was largely brought about by the "Luxembourg Compromise" of January 1955
in which the French Government ended Profegsor Hallstein's attempts to
defend the supra-national aapecta of the Treaties, especially majority
vobing. Since then the Conuniaslon's power of initiative has been
blunted by the ineistence of goverrunents that almost all decisions *rould
(1) Especially vis-i-vis its predecessor, the High Authority of ECSC.
Whereas in ECSC the High Authority, within the competencea transferred to
it by statea under the Paris Treaty, formulated policy, decided to
implement it, and then executed it, wit.h the "Speeial Council of Ministers"
intervening only in rare castea by giving opinions, or sometimeg aasent,
in the European Corununitie6 now, following the Merger Treaty, the
Conimission retaina only the powers of initiative and of execution
whereag the vital power of deciEion liee vrlth the Council. Although ir:
the new syatem Parliament hae a closer and more inmediate right of
control over the Comrnission than the Common Aagembly had over the High
Authority, it can conErol only the body which proposee the policy and
carriee it out but not the Council which decides it.
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be taken by unanimlty, although on a number of occagions ttE rigour of the
unanlmity ruls: has been amellorated by the abstention of one or more
member governmenta in a vote - a practicc which ghould be encouraged
untll thc Council returnB to majority voting.
lO. When the political Affaire Committee discussed the first draft of the
pregent report in June L974, the nature and implications of the "Luxemboug
Agreement', waB one of the points which moat concerned membere. At thie
point lt ahould be noted that the attitude of the member governments
conCerning the "Lqxembourg Agreement" Seema, El.nce tnen, tO have Started
to change for the better. fn October 1974 President Giscard d'Estaing
stated that the French Government would invite its partners to adopt more
flexible and swifter decision-making procedures in the Council in areae
where national lntereste were not in guestion. At the Paris SuNnit of
December 1974 the Heads of Government stated "that ii is neceasary to
renounce the practice which coneists of making agreenent on all questions
conditional on the unanimoug cons,ent of the member stateE, whatever their
reepective positiong may be regarding the conclusions reached in
Luxembourg on 28 January 1966." This declaration of principle is most
welcome but your Rapporteur wonders whether lt will be possible for
governmente to reach agreement on a political formula which can achieve
this aim. parliament should press governmeitB to do this and Ehould also
pre8B them to define the "vital national lnterests" of the'lLuxembourg
Agreernent "in such a way that this phrase cannot be conjured out of the hat
on every Occasion when a singLe member government wishes to impede a
reasonable decigion.
11. In view of the attitude dieplayed by the Heads of SEate or,Government
at paria laet Decernber, your Rapporteur does not consider it necessary to
enter into great detail concerning the precise legal naLure of the
,'Luxembourg Agreement". It is worth noting that a judgement of the Court
of;uetice of May 19?4 (1) stated "No provision of the TreatY (of acceesion),
or of related instrumertts, could be viewed as validating measures, whatever
their form, which ran counter to the Treatiee establishing the European
Conununities". By implication the "Luxembourg ComprOmise" would be
regarded as invalid by the Court Q). There is also the vexed point
of whether under Article 2 of the Treaty of Accession the three new Member
States are bound by the "Luxembourg Agreement". Is, in effect, the
,,Luxembourg Agreemcnt" an "act adopted by the instltutions of the CommuniEies"
within the meaning of thts Article?
(1) In Hauptzollamt Bielefeld v. Offene Handelsgesellschaft Firma EC Koenig.
(21 Although your RapPorteur does not accept the following argument, it
could be coneidei"a, however, that even if the interpretation given
to the declsion-making procedure of the Communities by the eix then
member governmenta iq regarded ae incompatlble with the Treatiee and
hrith the procedure laid down in Article 236 of the EEC Treat.y
concerning Che anendment of that Treaty, the partsies to an international
treaty, if they are ao agreed, can change it'
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L2. Whatever the nature of the "Luxembourg Agrcement! lt la thc effects
which are more inportant. It aeem8 to your RapPorteur that rather than
trying to unravel the preciae lega1 nature of the "Luxemboutg Agreement"
- 
whlch preEident Giscard d'Eataing himeelf hag described aa "perfectly
incomprehenelble" - it is more useful to see how, in the near futufe, the
present syatem of decigion-making can be improved. This is eeaentially a
political rather than a legal problem. The recent Paris Sunmlt haa
given the green light in this respect. Parllament and the Conulselon
must try to engure that, the governments reject, in the near future, the
present practlee, by which any non-unanimout deciaion-making procedure
is excluded fron the outeet-
13. lteanwhile, Parliament has almost ignored the implications for its
own role of the change in the institutional balance brought about by the
.Luxembourg Cornpromise". By concentrating on trylng to "control" the
Conunisgion in a period when the Member Statea have ahown t.haE they are
primarily intseresteC ln uelng the EuroPean Communltiea to achieve
intergovernmental cooperatlon rather than to move in a federal directlon,
parliameng has miedirected ita energy. In thia climate the Council has
increasingly confirmed its dominant statuB and Parliament has not only
been unable to "control" it, since until now It hag lacked the institutional
means to do so, but hae seemed tO be unaware that ltA "contr6l" Over
the Commission hae becone increasingly renote from the political realities
of the CommunitY.
"Extra-Treatv" forms of decision
14. It may be ueeful for your RapPorteur to list the principal ways in
which the l,tember @vernmente have developed "extra-Treaty" forms of
decision-making (1). Firat, there are "sutunitt' meetinge. Members of
the politicat Affalrs Comnittee have requested your RaPPorteur to enlarge
theemarks he made concerning "summit8" in the firat draft of thia rePort."
(1) "Extra-TreaEy" in this report means both: (a) subjeet matter or
areas not provided for inthe Tteaties; (b) forms of decision-making
and procedures not provided for in the Treaties. Further, your
Rapporteur wisheg, in this context, to recall the Report submitted
to Parliament in tlarch 1969 on Collective Acts of l,lember States of
the Community and Acts of the Council not foreseen under the Treaties
by Mr Burger for the regal Committee (Doc.215).
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'1.5. whoreal lt rcema approprlatc for Hcadl of State or @vtrruEGnt to meet
onrtroandvrryrpoclaloccltlonrtoglvaromcrnaJornGtdpolltical
lmpulalon to the work of thc Ntne, the P!!t Practlce of holdlng aununlt
meetlnga - whole retultB have, ln several calea, been very diaappOtnting -
can only, 1f they contl.nue to rcmaln outalde the tnatlEuttonal framsvork
of the Communlties, weaken the Community inetitutions which ehould
themservea provide adequate procedures for initiating an<i carrying through
conununlty policies or developing policies in new sectori with the help of
Articlea 235 or 236 of the EEC Treaty. Whereaa previous sumni'ts tended
to avoid treapassing on the Powers and reslrcnsibilit'ies of the conununity
inst,itutions themaelves, recent summits have tended to replece the council
by a form of ,,Super Council", working out complicated Cotuunity package
deale and, at the moat recent Paris summit of Decembet !g74, actually
talcing a detalled epeciflc declslon - to activate and apportlon the
Reglonal Fund - which would normally be the task of the council proper'
rn the courae of their meetings sumnits now deal both with Treaty and
non-Treaty questions. It ia very difficult to establigh a precise
dlviding line and so to judge when the Heads of Government (I) are acting
withln a Communlty context and when they are acting as national governments'
The relationshtp between sumnlte and council becomeB even nore obacure in
view of the Treety'a failure to define precleely the nature of the Councll
or even ita Preeiae conPotition'
rG. sunsnits have been the subject of harah judgements. rn particular
it has been argued that they build up e:<peetations which seem likely to
Proveonlytooillusory.Ithasaleobeenpointedou}-thatParliament
has no role at all to play in "aummitry" and that the conuniesion's power
of initlatLve hae been weakened even further ln view of the aims set by
GovernmentB at gummit conferenceE'
L7. But gumnrits have become an accepted means of doing business between
the goverrunentE of the Nine and whether they are appreciated or disliked
within the ingtitutions of the community it is most probable that they
will continue to be held, as is made clear by the communiqud of the Paris
,,summit" of December 1974. In these circumstances it ie not realistic
to confine commentE to critlcism of "gummitry". tndeed summiEa muat now
be accepted aE a fact of community life. Your RapporEeur considers,
therefore, that it might be useful for the Political Affaire committee
to examlne how sununit conferences might be brought more clearly wichin
(1) At the Parie meeting of December L9-14
not in the name of "Headg of State or
name of "Headt of @vernment" '
the communiquG was Published
of Government" but ln the
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the Community framer*ork and how some degree of political accountability
might be developed aa far al aummit,s are concerned. If the Heada of
covernment aet hrtthin the Comnunlty framework during the three annual
meetlngs they envleage under the recent Paria cormtunlqug it folIow! that
the President-in-Office of the Council (ln thia conCext the Head of
covernment himself) nust be prepared to reply to questions tabled
concerning their deliberatlons and work in plenary sessions of Parlianent.
Ig. The Heads of Government have themselvea indicated, in the cotmrunique
of the December 1974 Paris Summit, that they see aome inetitutionalisation
of their role ag neceaaary. Paragraph 3 Of the cotmtunigu€ etated: "The
Heads of @vernment have therefore decided to fteet, accompanied by the
l,linistere of Forelgn Affaire, three times a year and, 'lhenever neceoEary,
in the Council of the Communlties and in the context of political coopera-
tion. The adnlnietrative Secretariat will be provided for in an
appropriate manner with due regard for existing practicea and procedures."
One of the most difficult problems arising would aeem to be how to organise
the business of meetings of Heads of Governments in such a way as to allotr
them the necessary flexibility to discuss and decide on extra-Treaty
guestions whilst examining and deciding on Community busLness within the
framerrprk of the Council. A solution could be the division of the agenda
into trro parts, the first, serviced by the Council Secretqriat, dealing
wlth Cornmunitsy bu;iness, and the second, serviced by whatever form of
secretariat Inight be most appropriate, dealing with other questions of
eoncern to the Nine Governmentg. If eummite r^rere to function in such a
way they would be able to deal appropriately with existing Conurunity
competences and aleo wlEh new competencea not covered by the Treatieg.
The Secretariat concerned wlth the geeond (non-community) part of the
agenda could in practice take the form of aome kind of "polltieal
secretariat,, working closely with the Council secretariat and, in practice,
be an exteneion of it for extra-Treaty subject matter and for ensuring
"follow-up" to surnnit propoaals on extra-Treaty matters.
19. your Rapporteur would be most interested to have the reactions of
members of the Political Affairs Committee to these suggestions, which are
primarily designed, at the present stage, to provoke conuoent and
dlscussion in the Conunittee. Your Rapporteur does consider, however,
that if the work of the summit conferences srere organised within the
framerrork of the Council, as suggegted above, this could be a practical
move in the direction of full "European Union" at the level of governments.
Since paragraph 3 of the recent Paris conununiqu€ already foresees the
role of poreign Mlnisters ae being one of preparing sutunit meetings by
aetlng',ag lnitiators and coordinatora" it mlght be ueeful Eo think in
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terms of meetings of specialised ministers - such as Mlnisters of
Agriculture or Finance - being meetings of "Special Councils of the
Community" which would act, increasingly, within a new conception of the
Council, receiving instructions from summit meetings and having
reaponsibility to them, the aummits themselvee being a form of "Supreme"
Council. (f) As far as Community busineaa was concerned the aummlt syst.em
would thus be brought within the framework of the Council. The question
of the political accountability of summits would still renain to be
soLved, (2) but it ahould be easier for Parliament to establish some kind
of direct relationship with the new form of the Council. Fina1ly, your
Rapporteur considers that the Heads of C,overnment should forma[ invest
the Commlssion with the responsibility of drawing up all specific proposals
reguired to implement decisions reached at sununite, and Parliament should
be congulted concerning these proposals. one way of doing this might be
for the Political Affairs Committee to hold an instltutionalised
pre-summit colloguy with the foreign ministers some three or four weeks
before each sumnit at which members could make their suggestions concerning
mattera to be discuEeed at the eummit.
20. Then there ie the practice of "gentlemenre agrdements", of which the
most notorloue example is the "Luxembourg Agreement" of January L966, by
which Member covernments quite shamelessly buried the obligat,ion imposed
by Article 148 of the EEC Treaty to take decisions by majorit.y. There is
no Treaty baeis for "gentlemen's agreements" which, when they affect the
working of the Treaties, could even be considered to conetitute an implicit
breach of Article 235 of the EEC Treaty which lays down procedures for
treaty revision. though they might be considered useful to the extent that
they can provide a flexible basie for institutional development in cases
where it is not possible to revise the Treaties under Artrele 235.
2L. More recently both the Council itself and the representatives of
member states have developed the practice of adopting "resolutions".
OutEtanding examples are the reeolution of 17 January 1913 on industrial
policy and the reeolution of 22 lt'larch 1971 on economic and monetary union.
fn aome cases Council resolutiona constitute Community action programmes
laying down the broad lines of Community policy in a given field on which
future Community action can be baeed as well ae fixing the time limits for
Thoqh there is a danger of the decisions of the specialised
titinisters piling up and log-jamming summits which might come to
be regarded as a kind of Court of Appeal.
Here your Rapporteur would welcome the views of French members
of the Committee as to vrhether the President of the French Republic
ie directly accountable to the French Parliament for his activities
at summlt meetings.
(1)
(2)
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suchaction.InothercagegCouncilresolutionslaydowninternal
ProgranmesorgiveinstructionstoCouncilcommitteee.However,t,hese
resolutions can make requests to other community inetitutions' rn 
thiE
respectthqrimplementArticlel52oftheEECTreaEywhichEtates:.'The
CouncilmayrequesttheCommieeiontoundertakeanystudiegwhichtshe
council coneiders deeirable for the attainment of the comnon objectives'
andt'osubmittoitanyaPPropriateprotrrosals.',ResolutionsofrePresenta-
tivesofthememberatateaconstituteinternationalagreenenta.asthe
commission stated, in angwer to written Question 336/58 ('rournal Officiel
1968,c38/5).AtthoughlinkedwithComrrunitylawreaolutsionsofthis
secondkindmayperhapsbeconsideredto}ieoutsidethejurisdietionof
the court of Justice, as simple irErnationar agreements, but thie
Pointisnotscertain.Someobserversconsiderthattheyare,however,
bindingonmemberstatessinceparagraph3ofArticte3oftheTreatyof
Acceesion statea that new member states will "observe the principlea and
guidelinesderivingfromtheaedecl'arations,resolutiongorotherdecisiona
and will take such measures as may be neeegsary to ensure their implementa-
tion". Somewhat ambiguously this paragraph states that as far as
reeolutiona are concerned the new member atates "are in the same slbration
as original member Etates.''
22. In pracEice resolutions of both kinde aeem to be some kind of
intergovernmental,,gentlemen,sagreement,..Sincetheyhavenobaeisin
theTreaEiesandarenotdefinedthere,thereisnoobligationonthepart
of the council to consult Parlianent on the content of Euch resoluEions"
InsomecasestheCouncilhasbagedresolutionaonsuggeetionswhichithas
invited the corunission to make, but where this is not ao - and thie hae
sometinesprovedthecase-resolutionsthreatenthefunctionofthe
conunission since they could be considered as an attemPt by the council to
ugurPtheCommission,sroleofinitiative.YourRapPorteurwi'shesto
drawattenEionbotldopoinEemadebyMrDurieux,ChairmanoftheLiberal
andAlliesGroup,inhisstatementof25Aprillg.l4instragbourg.
MrDurieuxProPosedthattheCommissionandtheCogncilshoulddefinethe
nature,useandlegalobligationof,,reEoluEiong'..Healsocastdoubt
onthevalidiEyoftheeffectof''regolutiona.'sincetheydidnothave,
inhigvi.etl,alegalEtatusundertheTreaties,anditwaathugdifficult
togeehowtheseingtrumentscouldbebindingontheirrecipienEs.this
viewhasbeenuphel.dbythecourtofJusticeitselfinCorurrissionv.
LuxembourgandBelgium(caEes90and91of1963,seeRecueilL964,Page.!
1231 and L232).
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23. your Rapporteur considers that Parliament ghould 3et out its own
vierys concerning resolutlons. In Particular it migbt be useful to
BuggeEt that resolutionE must not be used to replace "decisions", as
defined in Artlcle 189 of the EEC Treaty, ln which the council decides
on propo3ala made by the Conunission followlng consultation of Parlianent.
As long aa the fundamental protection of the Conunission'a right of
initiative is engured, resolutions are useful in enabling the Council, in
a flexible way, to establiah particular policy alms in ner,r fieldg as
preparatory acts - it being for the Community institutions to carry out
the implementing legielative process. ,
and remai
basic reference documents for the areaE concerned. fn vier^r of their
significance, therefore, your RaPporteur congiders that by means of a
gentlemen,B agreement with t.he Council, Patliamenb ehould be coneulted
concerning all Council reaolutiona, by Council, excePt those which are
clearly withln the ambit of Afticle 152 of the EEC Treaty, in draft before
they are adopted. One eepecially important reason for Parlianent giving
ita opinion is the danger that resolutions may limit Lhe future freedom
of action of the Comnlsgion and the Council. As far as reaolutions of
repreaentatives of member states are concerned, it rnight be useful to
press the Corunisilon to eeize the Court of Justice concerning the nature
and bindlng effect of such instruments.
24. Then there is the political cooperation ayatem, under which the
Foreign ttinisters of the Nine meet and concert joint policies concerning
select.ed foreign policy iEsues which bind the national goverrunenta. This
practice is an effective one and is significant since it represents the
firet steps towards a @mmon foreign policy. However, the decisions are
taken on the basis of proposals not of the Commission or of any other
Community institution but of those representatives of national foreign
mlnistries who participate in the work of the Political Cotilnittee (I).
Admittedly the Commiseion is represented at discussions of the Political
Conunittee at which Community interests are involved, but only on an
informal bagie, and Parliament ie not formally consulted - though its
political Affaira Committee does at least hol-d colloquies with the Foreign
litinisters following their quarterly meetinge. Your Rapporteur comrnents
on the political cooperation procesa in some detail in Chapter vII of the
Report.
(1) Officially the Political Comrnittee of the lvlember States of the
European Conununities
fr
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Bodies not fofeEeen in the Treati
25. Beeides the nervr "extra-Treaty" forms of decision-making the Member
covernments have weighted the institutional balance further in their ovrn
favour by creating nem, bodiee which are not provided for irr the Treaties
of paris and Rome. Thus ttE Committee of Permanent RePresentatives,
whoee establishmenE r,raa confirmed by the Merger Treaty, not only prepares
decisiuns taken by the Council but in practice takee deciaions of ite own
in the form of the apeeial procedure (ueually refeired to as "A-pointe" )
which permits the Permanent RepreEentatives, if they come to an agreement
with the Commission, to propose that the Council should take a decieion
without discugsion on certain matters. Your RaPPott".rt drawE atten€ion,
in this eonnection, to paragraph 7 of the communigud of the Paris Summit
of December L974 which stated: "Greater latitude will be given to the
Permanent Representatives so that only the most important pclitical
problems need be discussed in the Council. To this end, each l{ember
State will take meaaureg it conEiders neceaEary to strengthen the role
of the Permanent Representatives and involve them in preparing the
national positions on European affairs." Parliament and the Corunigsion
should insist on a strict interpretation of Article 4 of the lterger Treaty
(which states that: "A Committee consisting of the Permanent Represent.atives
of the Member States shall be responsible for preparing the work of the
Council for carrying out the tasks aesigned to it by the Council.") 60
t.hat the Council should have to give specific authority to the Permanent
Representatives to discuss and decide on Communlty mattera in each cage.
The Foreign t'linisters of the Nine, in their quarterly meetings, which have
been referred to above also meet outside the Corununity franrework but take
decisions engaging the member countries of the Communly and irr this they
are helped by the Political comnittee composed of the Po1itical Directors
of national foreign ministries, whieh is not a Community institution but
a "paraIlel" one.
Contro_llinq "Extra-Treatv" deciaions and bodies
26. Aa in the case of summite, referred to in paragraph 1?, your Rapporteur
considere it pointless to Ery to challenge the growth and wr:rk of these new
"extra-Treaty" types of decieion-making and ingtitution. They have been
brought into being because they correspond to certain needs which have been
recognized by the Member Governments, and they have come to stay. But it
is necessary to ensure, that these institutional developments are brought,
as far as possible, into the framerrork of the Community itself. Specific
proposals as Eo how this might be done are made in the relevant sections
of this report and these are sunrmarised in Chapter vIfI.
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a
Art Ic_le 
-235
21. ,tn Contratu to axErt-Trcrly procodur€t, your RePPorteur wirhel to draw
attentlon, here, to Lhe poerlbillties that cxisE for breaking deadlocks
in deftning policies in nerrr flelds, wr-ghils the acope of the Treatiee of
Rome and Paris, by the use of Article 235 of the EEc TreaLy' Despite the
agreement of the Heads of state or Goverrunent exPreesed in the declaratsion
adoPtedaLtheParissummitofoctobet]:gl2thatueeehouldbemadeof
Article 235 in order to fill policy gaps in sectort where "fran€ryork policiea"
Co not already exiet, Iittle has been done in this sense' Your
RaPPorteurconsidergthatthecommissionhasareeponsibllitytomake
proposalsinthiEaengewhereveritigclearthatthe''Treatyhasnot
providedthenecessaryPoT,era...toattain...oneoftheobjectlvesofthe
community". The uEe of Artic1 e 235 would have the aclvantage of making
uge of a TreaLy procedure' even if it is a neglected one'
2a.NonethelessdiEcretionmustbeexercisedwithreEpecttoArticle235.
ItisinterestingtonotetheviewexpresgedbyMrArmengaud'as
RapporteuroftheLegalcommit'tee,concerningthepoaai.bleuseofArticle
235 concerning environment policy. Mr Armengaud stated (I) that t'he "Legal
CommitteeconsidersthatArticle235shouldinthefirstplacebe
consideredasanarticlewhoeeprincipalaimistofillposaiblegapsin
thecompetencesconferredontheinstitutionsbytheTreaty.Forsucha
huge matter as that of the Protection of the environment' an arrangement
of this kind does not, in the long term'Provide an adequate legal basis'
ForthisreasontheLegalCommitteeconsidersthattheapplicationof
Article235-whichcertainlyconst.ituteg,giventheLlrgencyoftheproblem,
avalidsolutionatthepresentmoment-ahould,inprinciple,be
provisionalinnature',.YourRapPorteurconsiders}-hattheconclusions
of the Legal Committee, as exPressed in l'1r Armengaud's report' provide
sound guidance on this question'
New Svq!-cm of Decision-Makinq
29.YourRaPporteurwiehestoturn,not.,,tothephrasewhichconcluded
paragrapltT?ofthecommttniqu€ptrblishedbythelleadgofstatcatthcParis
summit of December l9'',4: "The comPetence of the t'luroPean Asaembly will 
tre
extendedinparticularbygrantingitcertainPoweraintheCommunities.
legislativeprocess...Hoh,canthispromisebestsbetransformedinto
politicalreality?DotheNineGoverrrmentsmeanthattheyareprepared
toaccePtParliament,sopiniongonCommissionPropoaalsasbinding?Do
they mean to give Parliament the poq,er to introduce }egislative proposals,
despitethecomnisgion.srightofinitiative?Isthei.ntention,rather,
toextend,asyourRaPPorteurhasalreadyproposed,ttreuseofthe
(I) In Document L5/'t2 (PE 29'L79)
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eonsultaLion or concertation procedure from the important but comparatively
l,imitccl budgetary sector to the whole range of Cornmunity legislative
proposale? Your Rapporteur would welcome the advice of membere of the
Politlcal Committee on the most appropriate attitude for Parlianent to
adopt, but hiE otirn tentative view is that although it should be for the
Commission to make formal proposals aimed at defining and implementing the
, proposals made by the Nine Governments, Parliament should already take
up the challenge. If members of the Politica1 Committee agree with this
suggestion it may be useful for the Committee to invite the President of
the Commission to take part in an exchange of vievrs with members, after
the Committee haE itEe1f elaborated suitable proposals, so as to assist
the Commission in preparing appropriate proposals.
30. one new idea which may be considered at such a meeting could be that
of Parliament exercieing a por.rer of initiative analogous to "Erlvglg
-, Members Bills" (1) which would not replace but eomplement the Commigsion's
right of initiative and whose financial implications muat be clearly
defined. Under this proposal it might be possible for a Cornmittee of
Parliament to draft proposed legislation which would then, following
approval by the Bureau, be voted on in plenary session and, if agreed,
transmitted to the Commission which would be obliged to submit it (possibty
with modifications) to the Council. Thereafter it would follow the
normal course of Corununity legislation with provision for accelerated
procedure in Parliament if unchanged or only insignificantly changed by the
Commission. Any proposed legislation of this kind involving financial
expenditure would have to wait until the adoption of the subsequent annual
budget (which, it. should be remembered, Parliament can now amend) before
implementation. On this suggestion, again, your Rapporteur would welcome
the commenEs of members of the Committee.
31. Your Rapporteur considers, however, that Parliament's role in the
decision-making process of the Communities might best be increased, in the
near future, by an extension of the use of the concertation procedure, one
major argument for such an approach being that the member governments have
already agreed to the use of this procedure concerning Acts with financial
implications and that two concertation meetings between Parliament and the
council have already been held concerning budgetary powers. rt seems, in
effect, as if a greater use of the concertation procedure is what the Heads
(1) Legislation introduced by individual Members of Parliament. fn theIluropean Parliament t,his could perhaps be achieved by means oflcgi.slat ion inl-roducect by a number of members in the form of aMotion f<>r ;r llcs()lut ion.
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of covernment meant by the "certain powers" of paragraph 12 of the Deeember
I,t74 Paris eommunigu6. In effect hc wiehes to suggesb uhat the systenr he
;rro;.xrscrl in hts Opinion of O<'tobt'r l(17 I (l ) bt' itrl rotlrtt'r'rl rtrrt ntt.rt, ly irr I lrr'
(.ase of proposals for AcEe with f inancial impllcations but for aII Icgislirt ivr'
proposale. Under thla system, t^,hen the Corunission has eetablished its
legislative propoeal it would Eeize Parliament of thie text. Parliament
would then hold a debate on the Comrnission'a propoaal. This would have
the advantage of allowing Parliament to for^nulate and express its views
concerning propoEals by the Conunission before the Council was seized and
before the Governnents started to entrench their positions. The Conunission
would then send its proposal together with the-amendments adopted by
Parliament - set out as parallel texts - to the Council. The Council
would then reaeh its decision concerning both the Commission's proposal
and the amendments proposed by Parliament. It woulq take this decision
not in secret but in public. When the Council differs II_ALL. from the
opinion expressed by Parliament a second reading should be held by Parliament.
tf, within a specified time limit, the Council should not change its
decision so as to agree with Parliament or vice versa, an automatic
concertaEion procedure should be adopted.
32. This procedure would be obligatory. If changes made by the Council
were minimal or serrantic, the second reading by Parliament could be a mere
formality. If, however, Parliament considered the changes to be
significant ones, it would proceed to a full debate. This r^pu1d avoid
the pro&m of who would define, and how, whether the eouncil wished to
"depart markedly" from the opinion given by Parliament on the first
considerat ion.
33. Any compromise formula agreed between the Representatives of the
Council and of Parliament within the framework of a Concert.ation Committee
(21, in whose work the CommiEsion would also take part, would be binding
on the Council and Parliament after ratificat,ion by the two institutions.
Thc Conct rtation committee would be instructed to sit until a eompromise
agrc('m(.nt. was rcachcd. I f both institutiona aqrccd wiLh the compromisc
formula proposed hy the concertation Committee, this compromisc solution
would enter into effect inunediately following the conclusion of the second
of the dccieions to be taken respectively by the Councj.l and Parliament.
For the Poli+-ical Affairs Corunittee, on l.tr Sp€nale's Report, on
behalf of the Conunittee on Budgetg, on the Communication from the
Comrission on the strengthening of the Budgetary ?ohrers of the
European Parliament (PE 33.89o).
In which the Council would be represented not only by its President
but by a representative of each member state ano Parliament would
be represented not only by its President but representatives of thepolitical groups and the Committees directly concerned. ft is
interesting to note that two concertation meetings between ParliamenE
and the Council have already been held, during L974, concerning the
new budgetary procedure. At the second of these meetings all member
states were represented, on the Council side, most of them by
Minist.crs of Foreign Affairs.
(l )
(2)
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34. But if the council is not prepared to agree to the use of the above
procedure in tshe case of all legislative proposals Parliament will have to
adopt a di fforcnc a;>proach. Ideally, what is needed is a means of
ensrrring Lhat Council must, voEe on all amendmenta made by Parliament Eo
proposed legislation. To achieve this new r^rording might be inserted into
the EEC Treaty ae follows: "Where, in pureuance of Ehis Treaty the Council
may act on a proposal from the conunission only after coneulting the Assembly,
the Councit shall consider the text of the ProPo8al, ae amended by the
Assembly, and unanimity shall be required for an act conEtituting an
amendment to that ProPosal. (1)
35. your Rapporteur realises, however, that the possibility of anending
the Treaty in this sense is remote, even though such an amendment is' in
principle, necessary. Meanwhile action should be taken to ensure that
parliament be able to scrutinise amended legislation submitted by the
commission to the council. At present the cornmission is free, following
reference of these proposals to Parliament by the Councll, to make amendments
in accordance not only with proposals of Parliament but also in the light
of its consultation with the council. such amendnents, involving changes
to the original proposal, are not always scrutinised by Parliament' Your
Rapporteur considers that whenever the Corunission puts fonvard revised
proposals Parliament should have an oPPortunity of considering and giving
an opinion on them. Amendments made by the Commission might require
further parliamentary scrutiny. Parliament should decide which Committees
should consider such amended proposals. These Comrnittees could rePort
to Parliament whether they require further parliamentary scrutiny or ot'her
follow-uP.
Relations $rith National Parliaments
36. No examination of the role of Parliament in decision-making would be
complete without reference to the role of national parliaments' Some
play a major role in influencing Colrununity decision-making, others are
lcss concerncd. YOtrr Rapporteur does not wish to comment on thiE
qucstion in substance but merely wishes to point out thaE Mr Jahn has becn
requested Eo prepare a rePort on relations between the European Parliament
and naEional parliaments for the Political Affairs Conunittee' In Junc 1974
members of Ehe Comnittee aEressed the importance they attached to this
subject. It iE bo be hoPed, therefore, that Mr Jahn's report will be
available shortlY.
(1) In view of an amen&nent of Article L49 of the EEC Treaty.
PE 50,948/f in. /enn
A.
III
CONTROIJ OVER THE
REIATIONS WITH
coHurssroN AIiID
THB COT'NCII,
g7. :fhe moet cffoctive way ln which Parliamcnt can devclop lts poYrGrB
of control over the Conmieglon is probably ttrrough increaclng its role
in the establishtnent of the Communities' budget. Before moving on to
that point 1n Chapter fV Tour Rapporteur wishcs to eramine
the general relationship between Parliament and the Commlsaion'
Irlotion of Coneure
3g. parliament,s maln instrument of contro! over tho Corurlasion is iEg
power Eo diemiae the Conunierion as a whole by a motion of, ccnaurc if this
ig carried by a 2/3 w)otity of the votee ca!t, repreaenting a rnajority
of the menbers of the Aaaernb1y, undcr Articls 144 of the EEC freaty (wttich
vaa carr[ed oyer from thc Parie Sreaty). Etrc problcm ie that thie ie
noE a refined instrutnent. Its use would crcatc such a major cricls that
nembere of, parliannnt have refrained fron carrying it through, though its
uae hal bcon thrcatened on a limited nuniber of occasions' The use of a
rnotlon of c€naure eould rebound against Parliament since thcre is nothing
to etop natlonal Gov€rntnGnta replacing a digmigsed Com1rlsgion by a nsw one
with exactly th€ aame membcrahip. But if thc posaibllity of censure did
not lurk in the background it ie difficult to believe that the comission
would pay aE much attention to Parliament's gucstions,aa it does or liaten
Bo at,tentively to Parliament'g views. Further, if Parliament were to
dcvelop gone voice in the appointnent of the Conmigslon itl influence over
the Corrmlgcion trould clearly be greater'
39. Your Ralfrortcur would rrfuh to aee the introduetion of a new and nore
rcfinsd weaPon to cotlplcnent thc diemissal of the whole Cpmnission'
ftrir rpuld br the pofl€r for Parliament to brlng aboUt thc dlrnltlal of
lndtvldual Corrnlrrioncrt. ltrue although th€ Comrispion is a collcgiatc
body rdlS I co[.Gd,rtc rcrponrlblllty the colloglate charecter of the
Colulrrl.on rhould not prcvont lndividual Coml.arlonen fronr boing
accountable for acttvitiec in their apecifig tQctor since thcy arc not
clvil !.rvrntr but polltical figures. rhia uould be a rcrc flcxible
rnd rpproprlato inltruncnt of control over tho Conuisrlon aince it would
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enable Parliament to demonstrate its discontent at failure to make
sufficient progress in one or other sector through ttre dismissal of the
responsible Commissioner if it were to feel that the fault lay with the
conuniEEl0n rather than with the council. ltre dLsrniseal 0f an indlvidual
commiseioner courd be brought about by Parliamcnt adoPting a Reeolution
regueating the President of the cornmiesion to "call for" the drleniseal of
onG or more individuaL Commissionera'
40. ftre dismissal of individual comnrissioners could be brought about in
two otlrer rray8. Parliament could introduce a rnotion for a resolution'
under its nornal Proeedures, calling for the resignation of one or more
ConunissionerB, making it clear to the ConuriEgion that if the Commissioner
or commissioners concerned did not resign it would proceed to vote a motion
of censure on the cormiEsion as a whole. Alternatively, Parliament could
vote the reduction of the conunission's budget by the amount of one unit of
account of the salary of one cotmrissioner or, if need be, the reduction of
that anount from the calaries of a nurnlccr of commisgionerg'
4L. From the dismigeal of the conunission it ie logical to move on to the
appointmentofitsmembers.lfhe,VedelReport.,drewattentionEothe
Eituation in which: ,,curiously enough the Treaties which give the Assembly
the power to overthrow ttre comrission do not provide for its intervention
in the nomination of its members v*rich is decided only by agreenrent of the
MemberStates'.underArticlelloftheMergerTreaty.
42. It is sornetimes suggested that Parliament itself ehould nominate
members of the Comdssion. your Rapporteur agrees, however, with the
vedel Report in considering that: "the nomination of nembers of the
comiEsion by the Parliament cannot be envisaged' lIhe institutional
relationships between the commission and the council and the commission's
lrcsition with regard to the national goverrunents neceEsitate for 
the very
maintenance of ite authority that its membere be choEen by the GovernmentE'
,rheVedelRePortsuggestethatParliamentmight,nonetbeless,reeelvea
power of co-decision in Ehis matter, notably through approving the
Governmcnts' choice of Ehe PresldenL of Ehe Commisslon' Your Rapporteur
agreeswithEhlsaimbutifitisnotpoeeibletogaintheassent'ofthe
council for this idea it h,ould be useful to PrqBs for the implementation
of the proposal nade by sir Derek walker-smith and llr lJautenschlager in
theirreportforthestudygrouPontheEuropeanParliament'sworking
methods and procedures Ph 34.7421 that Member rGovernments of the Nine
should be bound to choose members of the corunission from a list of
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elndldotc5 clrawn ut) by ltitrliament - this llat (1) contlnlng the names of
two or three tlmea more candldatec than therG are membera of t,he Conunlraion.
43. Further, yorlr Rapporteur considers that Parllament ehould reguest
newly appointed members of the Commission to appear before the appropriate
Corunit,tees of Parliament to express their vielrs and ideas concerning the
sector of their responsibility in a public hearing. This would go some
way to\^,ards the role of the US Senate in the appointment of membere of the
US Administration.
Hearinqs
44. In his llemorandum on the Procedures and Practices of the European
parliament submitted to the Enlarged Bureau in January 1973 your RaPPorteur
proposed that ,,Parliament's Committees should be considered free to invite
any institutions or individuals to give written or oral evidence and should
be encouraged to hold "hearings" whenever thece assiet in their enquiries...
only by hearing evidence, and preferably in public, will the Conunittees
fulfil adequately the functions for which they should exiet...at the st.art
of each annual Session, each Conunittee of the Parllarnent should be aeked to
choose at least one field of enquiry, not relevant to any specific
Iegislation to which it intends to pursue during the following year. Later
in the year Conmittees would report their findings to the Parliament and
debates rrculd be organised in plenary session on the baeis of these reports."
45. The Working Party which has Etudied Parliament's working methods and
procedures under the chairmanship of !4r Schuijt has, meanwhile, come out
strongly in favour of the organisation of euch hearings as a regular part
of the work of Comnittees. ft should be noted that under its exist,ing
Rules of proeedure there is nothing to Btop Parliament's conunittees from
hotding hearings or doing so in public.
4G. your Rappotteur considers that hearings should regularly involve
Comnissioners and senior members of their etaff. The regular participation
of the Comnission in hearings would be uEeful, in institutional terma, in
helping to formalise the Conuniseion's responsibility to keep Parliament
fu1ly informed.
(1) l{hich should, in your Rapporteur's vierw, contain the names of
some of the most appropriately qualified members of the Europeanparliament. This could provide incentives and a European political
career slructure for directly elected members, who, after a
succeesful spell in Parliament, could look for*rard to the possibility
of becoming a comnissioner.
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47 . On its side the corunission has stated that it: "welcomes in principle
the propoeal in the Kirk Irtemorandum to hold hearings, wheiher in public or
otherwise, for the purpoee of examining the policles of the corununity and
t.he manner in which thcse policles arc carried out in practice' It believes
that such hearlngs could be valuable in terma of informing public opinion
within the Comnunlty or Parliament. While awaiting Parliament'e specific
views on this proposal, the Commission will be Considering how it could
best help in the conduct of any such hearings"'(1)
4g. your Rapporteur hopes that the Bureau will encourage Lhe Conuittees
to develop the practice of hearings in the sense otitlined above' He notes
that during the past months certain "hearingE" have already been organised
by parliament's committees, though these have not met two essential
criteria: (a) that evidence be recorded and published; (b) that hearings
be in public. However, since the first draft of this report was discussed
the Committee on Regional Policy and Tranaport has developed plans to hold
a public hearing on inter-city transport of the fuEure. The proceedings
of thig hearing will be published, and the Bureau has given the Comnittee
the necegaary aut,horigation to go ahead
ceneral Report
49. The General Report has lost much of the significance )-hat it had under
the European Coal and Steel Community. Thie is partly because urder tbe
Treaty of parie the only occasion on which Parliament could adopt a motion
of cengure was concerning the High Authority's General RePcrt, whereas now
parliament lE able to adopt a motion of cenEure on the Corunission at any
time, and partly because Parliament's interest quite naturaily focuseg more
on the action programme for the forthcoming year that the Commission now
presents together with the general report than on the Comnission's RePort
on the previous year's activities.
5O. In this reepect Sir Derek Walker-Smith and t{r Lautenschlager, in
t,heir report for the Study Group on the European Parliament's working
methods and procedures, have commented that: "The Treaties impoEe uPon
the European parliament the obligation to superviee carefully the paat
activity of the Conuntrnity. This duty is not disputed. ft musts not be
neglected. Conelderation Ehould be given to whether the procedure now
in uee ie too aumary, not so much in the length of the reeoluEton and
the lenEfir of tshe debate in plenary sitting as in the critlcal exanination
in the Conunittees lhemselves. Should they devote more time to it?"
(1) Conununication from the Corunission on practical measurea to
strengthen the powers of control of tle Parliament and to improve
relations betweln the parliarnent and tleColrmission (PE 33.489).
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5J.. Your Rapporttur eoncldcrc thls pplnt to bs o rclevant onc but in hlg
view {f the propogals Ehat he outlinee ln Chaptor IV of Ehis rcport
concerning budgetary control and how to increase Parliament's vo'ice
concerning the policy options of the Comniseion are imptemented Parliament
will be concerned as much with shaping emerging policies as with
commenting on how well the Commission has Or has not performed in
implementing Community policies, though thiE latter function might be
given extra point by being coribined with the debate on the discharge of
the budget - in which spokeemen of the budgetary Sub-commitLees, whoEe
creation is proposed by your Rapporteur in Chapter fV, could comment on
the performance of the conunission over the preceding year. This would
help to compensate for the out-of-date nature of the contents of the
General RePort.
Questions
52. So much emphasis has been placed, in recent months, on invigorating
the procedures used by Parliament in tabling questions to the Commission
that nothing need be added by your RaPPorteur on the present occasion
concerning this major instrument of control.
Administrative Action bv the Commission
53. Your Rapporteur welcomes the Commission's decision to strengthen
iEs cootrrration with Parliament on tlre organisational 1evel. First, it
has appointed one of its Vice-Presidents lrt. Scarascia-l.tugno22a. to assist
the President of the Commission in the conduct of relations with Parliament.
Second, it should be noted that in 1973 the newly appointed second Assistants
Secretary-General of the Consnission was given the specific responsibility
of following relations, within the Secretariat, between the Corunission
and Parliament.
B. Relations wiFh the Council
54. Conventional wisdom has it that Parliament's relationship with the
Commission - the ,'motor of the Community", "the executive of the Community",
,,the nucleus of a future European Government" - is by far its most ituportant.
institutional link. fn Practice, as the second chapter of this rePort tries
to ahow, the role of the Conunlgsion has dlmlnished so much over the years
and Ehat of the Council has lncreased so much that Parliament should eeek
to establish a much closer relationship with the Council. Unfortunately,
the 1inks between parliament and the Council are not, yet adeguate though
the introduclion of the concertation procedure concerning budgetary
guestions has improved theee linkE and the opportunitiee open to Parlianent
to obtain any degree of control over the Council's activities remal-n
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limited. The council is not directly responsibre to any oEher body,
though its individual members are resPonsible to their national governments
andparliamentsintheircapacityasminiEtera.InPartictrlartheCouncil
is not resPonsible to Parliament'
55.Toe:q)resealdbit,ioushopesforasignificantchangeinthissituation
is unrealistic in the existing political context. Your RaPlprteur merely
wishes to note that a very considerabte improvement in the working of the
institrrEions and the balance of the community coul'd be brotrght about if the
coverrunenLs of the Nine wcre Eo agrec to take maiorlEy deelsions ln tho
Councilwherevervitalnationalintereetewerenotaffectetl(r).Itie
well known that the Council is acting against Article 148 of the EEC Treaty
in insisting that its deciEions be taken by unanimity' It is equally well
known that the reason for this is the "Luxembourg comPromise" of January
1966 which recorded the agreement of the then Member States that on matters
where a decieion which could be taken by majorlty vote on the pro1rceal from
the conunission would affect very important interests of one or more Partners'
themembersoftheCouncilwouldendeavourtoreachaunan'imousdecision
within a reasonabre time. [Iowever, at Luxembourg in JanLlary L966, the
French @vernment insieted that "tr'here very important interests are at
stake, the discuseion should (or ,,must'' according to the translation of th,e
original French ,,@g,,) be contlnued until unanimous agreement is reached.l'
Regrettably "very imPortant interests" have never been defined and t'he
unanimityrulehaseincebeenappliedtoevervtypeofdecision.Thug,ag
memberg of the German Government have stated in public' your Rapporteur
wj.sheEtoemphasiaeagforciblyaspossiblethattheCouncilshouldreturn
assoonaspossibletoitsrealtaskofbeinga',Communityinstitution''
instead of continuing to play out its PoEt-1956 role of being a mere
diplomatic conference of national states. If this were so the comission's
power of initiative would again have some meaning and Parliament'8
relations with the conunission would regain their significance. l'leanwhile
parliament should encourage each member government to send ministers to
participate in plenary debateg, on behalf of the Council' so that a
gpectrum of governmental vier.rs can be expressed in debate - not just the
monolithic viewpoint of the preEidert of the council, though even he, as
your Rapporteur is glad to note, has, on occasion, expressed personal vieus
on European igEueg as well as mouthing Ehe official line of the council'
Another idea which could be implemented as an interim mBaaure before a ret'urn
to majority voElng in the councll could be tshat put' fonrard by ltr Borschette
by which if some Governments did not wiEh to go ahead wiEh a particular
projectthosethatdidwishtodosowouldbeabletodothisundera
,'partial agreement" formula akin to that used in the council of Europe'
(I) The Heads of C,overnment themselves arrived'at a very similar
conclusiot-in p"t"graph 5 of the communiqu€ of the Paris Summit
of December Lgl74, ir,oogt, expressed in roundabout language-
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5G. As with questions to the Comnission Eufficient streas has recently been
placed on the role of guestions to the CouncLl - particularly by the intro-
duction of oral questions with debate - to make it unnecealary for your
Rapporteur to conmrent here on this link between Parliament and the Council,
apart from expressing his EatiEfaction that at the Paris Summit of
December 1974 the HeadE of @vernnent authorised the Pre8ident of the
Council t,o rePly to qtrestions put to him by membere of Parllament
concerning political cooperaEion - a conccesion prevloualy urged by Lord
Chelwood and Your RaPPorteur.
5?. Tr.ro final ideas. Firgt, your RaPporteur wonders whether it might
be feasible to involve not only the CornrniEEion but also the Council in
the ,,hearing,, procedure discuEsed in the first part of the present chapter.
A neur relationship between Parliament and the Council could be developed if
the president of the council were to agree to appear before the appropriate
Comnittee to explain and define the Council's views coocerning particularly
important conununity policy issues or problems. under paragraph 2 of
rule 40 of the Rules of Procedure Parliament'g Conunittees are already
empowered to invite the Corncil (as well as the Comniesion) to take part
in Conmrittee meetings.
58. Seconcl, t>arllament should demand that t,he President of the council
should agree to r'eceive ite President whenever he is regueated by Parliaments
to preaent its views on a particular question. This right of accees should
be formal and should be distinct from the informal meetings which take
place, from time to time, between the Presidents of the Council, Comnission
and Parliament.
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IV
BI,'DGETARY CONTROL
59.HavingexaminedwaysinwhichParliamentmightincreasethe
effectiveness of its control over the Cornmission and other Comrunity
inetitutions, and, a1eo, ways in which it might buir{ on its mea€rre
channelE of cormunication with the Council' your RaPPorteur now wiehes to
turn to the most important single element of control at Parliament's
disposal - that of budgetary control over the cormniEEion' It Ehould be
noted that the nrain Powers of Parliament in the budgetary field are:
(a) the adoption of the entire conuuunity budget (from 1975); (b) the final
word over non-obligatory expenditure (from 1975) and the right of discharge
of the budget (since I97l) '
60. In view of the Resolution adopted by Parliament on 5 October 1973 and
in view of the two exhaustive reports sr:bmitted to Parliament at that time
by l{r Sp.6nale, as Chairnan and Rapporteur of the Committee on Budgets, and
by your preaent RaPporteur ae Rapporteur of the Political Affairs committee'
there is no need to repeat Parliament's basic attitude concerning the
introduction of the new comnuniey budgetary system, based on own resources'
asfromlJanr.arylgT5orthefullrangeofingtitutionalproposalsmade
in october 1973 concerning Parliament's relations with the council and
Conunission.
61. In this chapter your RaPPorteur seeks to demonstrate that ParliamenE
can, through budgetary means, and without treaty nrodifications, develop
substantialty its influence on the options oPen to the connnission in
formulating policy proposals in the different sectors within its competence'
All that is needed to help Parliament bring about this situation' aPart
from its oun efforts and decieions, is the practical cooperation of the
Comnission.
62. Your Rapporteur'S protrrcsals do not cover control over past expenditure
(the task of the court of Auditors and of the 'Public Accounts" Sub-cormritstee
of the committee on Budgets which, it is hoped, will be established soon)
but planned expenditure. They take a6 a starting point the present role
of the CotElittee on Budgets. Normally, when the Corunisgion Puts forward a
new policy proposal for an Act with financial implications the role of the
committee on Budgets is to give its opinion, at an early stage, to the
Comnittee comPetent for the substance of the proposal concerned' In giving
its opinion the comlittee on Budgets will nornally take two factors into
consideration:
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(a)Itsviewofthesu]cstantivemerits(orotherwise)
of the Commiesion's ProPoEaIsl
(b) Ite gcneral eetimation of whether or not the cotmrission's
proposa!. seens lensible from a budgetary polnt of view - in
this context the committee will be on the watch to s€e vrhether
ornottheproposalreguiressupplementaryestimateetobe
submitted bY the Commiesion'
53. I'he task of the conmittee on Budgets Is' at Present, basically
fulfilled when it has given its opinion to the competent Comnit'tee, which
is then free to complete its report and submit a ReEo1ur-ion to Parliament'
It is, of course, open to members of the committee on Budgets to t'able
amendments to the Resolution submitted by the competent comnittee during
the plenary debate in Parliament. Your RaPPorteur believes that this
syetem could be imProved'
64. Although the present system works smoothly in a -ourely mechanical
aense it fails to give Parliament:
(a) an adeguate oPPortunity to scrutinize in detail the
expendi.ture involved in Corunission proposals' since' as
rePresentativesoftheConurritteeonBudgetshavestated
on a nuniber of occasions, the commission has not yet
developedthepracticeofsubmittingdetailedfinancial
schedulcs to Parliamenti
(b) a genuine voice in shaping the policy options open
to the Commission, in light of its budgetary possibilities'
within Ehe different sectors of its activity'
65. Further, the opinion of the Conmittee on Budgets is, under the present
system, given to the competent conunittee too early in the latter's
deliJcerations to affect its final reconmendations to Parliament to the
extent that it might do'
66.lftrusinsteadoftheCorrunitteeonBudgetstryingtocompletethe
overwhelmingly difficult task of establishing an opinion on both the
substantive and budgetary aspects of -ry, proposal of the commission for
an Act with financial implicatsions, your Rapporteur ventures to suggest
that it, r,uould be more efficient for each of Parliament.s conmittees which
has a clear compeEence concerning the work of one or other of the
Directoratea-General of tshe commission to establish a surb-committee
res;ronsible to it for examining, in detail, the butigetary implicationE of
all proposals of the comniseion within its field of competence'
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67. The main poinL of this suggest,ion wourd bo to enable each ot
Parliament's Commlttees to develop its own budgetary expertise within the
field of its specific competence. Both in order to help Eqb-comrnittees
of this kind to acquire the necessary budgetary expertise and technigues
and in order to link the work of these sr:b-comnrittees with the overall
Etrategy of the committee on Budgets, it would seem desirabre for a
separate nember of the Committee on Budgets to be appoLnted to take part in
the work of each of these new budgetary sub-committees. Ttre implementation
of this suggestion might possi-bly require changes in parliament's Rules
of Procedure.
68' The function of the budgetary sub-committees rculd be twofoll . First,
they would be expected to examine all the financial details of proposals
for Acts with financial implications. Seeond, they would be able to give
advice and guidance to their parent, committee on the attit,ude that it might
wish to adopt concerning the medium-term development of the Cornmission,s
policies within its sector.
59. As far as the first of these two functions is concernedr lour Rapporteur
wishes to underline the need for the Conunission to submit to parliament a
detailed financial schedule with each proposal for an Act $rith financial
implications. rn the Report he submitted to the parliament on behalf of
the committee on Bu<igets on the Draft Generar Budget of the European
Conununities for 1974 (Doc.L87/73), I.lr Rafton pounder referred to the details
needed for these financial schedules if they are to be of use to parliament.
Ttrese are:
' - rndication of the links between the financial implications
of the meaaures proposed and the annual budget (s) , and
therefore
- indication of the overall ost;
- as detailed a breakdown of expenditure qs possible
using the budgetary nomenclature (Title, Chapter.
Article, Item);
- in the case of expenditure not covered by the
budgetary nomenclature, suggested line in the budget
with an accurate heading;
- Breakdown of expenditure in time;
- effect on the current budget;
- effect on the draft budget in preparation;
- effect on the multi-year estimates and therefore on
future annual budgets;
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- rndicat,ion of whether expenditure will be covcred by
receipts and therefore
- 
whether it witl be covered by the appropriations provided
in the current budget;
- whether it can be covered by transferE;
- 
whether it will have to be covered by new budget
appropriations: in a future budget, by a supplemerrtary
budget;
- Effect on the various components of own resources:
- 
other than VAT;
- 
VAT;
- Indication of the financial implications to allow a
comparison with expenditure provid.ed for and actualry
effected in past financial years or in the current
financial year, so that it can be decided whether or not
requests for new appropriations are justified;
- Expranation of the bases on which the estimates have been
made;
- Indication of
- 
a bracket. showing minimum and maximum estimates of
'cogts;
- 
alternative assessments of financial implications,.
- degree of uncertainty of the estimates;
- comparison of the financiar imprications of an act with
those of all the acts already adopted in the current
financial yeart
- Explanations of the effects of acts having financial
imprications in terms of 'financial machinery and liquid
assets t . t'
70. l'lr Pounder arso provided, on pages r4(a), (b) and (c) of his R€port,
a model for setting out financial schedules. Your Rapporteur considers
the willingness of the commission to cooperate with parrrament by
providing financial schedules of this kind to be crucial iir the development,
of detailed budgetary control by Parliament over proposals for Acts with
financial implications. only if this is done can proposals be costed
adequately. I{ith the establishment of the coLlrt of Auditors and of a
"Public Accounts Conunittee" type Sub-Committee of the Committee on Budgets
to control Comnunity expenditure once it has been made, the introduction of
the proposed parlianentary checks on the ptanning of expenditure should
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constitute an effective two-prong "before and after" control eyetem over
the Community budget.
7L. But the second function is perhaps more important. tfhen the budgecary
sub-committees have gathered together all the relevant financial information
concerning not only individual proposals for ActE with financial implications
but the total budget for the work of their equivalent Directorates-General,
the parent Comnrittees should be able to asseas all the major policy options
open to the Commiegion in that sector of its work in the light of the funds
available.
72. rn their work of examining and costing proposals for Acts with financial
implications and of examining atternative policy options the budgetary Sub-
committees should, in your Rapporteur's viehr, make use, wherever appropriate,
of hearings. Commissioners and members of their staffs and also independent
experts should be convened fo:: cross-examination by the Sub-committees, and
these cross-examinations should be held in public. One of the conclusions of
the study of the Parliament's working methods and procedures carried ouE by
the gtorking Party under the Chairmanship of l,lr Schjuit was that greater
emphasis should be placed on the use of the hearing teehnique. The "open"
nature of hearirrgs is imSrortant, also, to demonstrate to the European peoples
and the media that Parliament, and thus by definition the representatives of
the European peoples, are playing a fuII and effective role in costing
comnunity policy and in determining policy options.
?3. When committees are ready to assess the reports made to them by their
budgetary sub-committees the Committee on Budgetsshould be brought bad( into
the picture to give a second opinion on the budgetary implications of the
specific proposals under consideration. At the moment the Budget Committee's
comments are restricted to the proposals of the Commission and once this
opinion has been given the Budget Corunittee'E involvement comes to an end.
The idea of a second opinion would permit the Committee on Budgets to examine
the financial implications of the proposals of tshe other Committees of
Parliament, and seek to place them in their proper budgetary context. This
would involve a change in the regulations of Parliament and would also entail
further cooperation from the European Commission which would be expected to
provide the Committee on Budgets with the extra detaile necessary for it to
conunent on the financial aspects of amendments to the Commission's proposals.
Tttis would seem to be in keeping with the need for financial responsibility
on Parliament's part and it would increase the impact cf the work of the
Committee on Bud-gets, since at the moment its viewE on the original proposals
become out of date once the competent comnittees have interposed their viewg
and made amendments to the proposals of the Conunission.
24. At the moment Parliament receives a three-year forecast from the Conun-
ission of its Budget to enable the Parliament to examine expenditure in the
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context of budgetary options and priorities in the following years' :rhe
establishnent of pluri-annual Community estimates was envisaged by the
Council's decision of 2L April 1970. Your Rapporteur would like to suggest
that the Commission extends its present forecaste on the basis of a first
year binding provision, and firm estimates for years 2 and 3 plue additional
projections of the figures of year 3 for years 4 and 5 taking lnto aecount'
on-going expenditure already knorn and planned new projects with expenditure
implications. llhe present pluri-annual eatinates provided by the Cornmission
seem inadequate. ftris, in any case, was the view taken by !{r Rossi in his
report on the estimates for L974'?5-76 (PE 35. O2g/fLnal). . In the t'esolution
passed by Parliament it was pointed out that the figures given were based
exclusively on decisions and rules already in force as well as on formal
conunission proposals, rather than being on a thore dynamic baEiS including
proposals that the commission believes it would be bringing forward in the
subsequent years. Ttre commission has up until now relied too heavily on
minimum figures in the case of the agricultural sector ; and in the case of
the Regional Fund and social Action Programme it has not submitted figures
sufficiently detailed or justified. It should provide a realistic range of
figures. As l,lr Rossi pointed out, if the commission believed that the
decision of 2L ApriI 197O was too restrictive then it should seek modification
to that decision. In your Rapporteur'e view these figures provided by the
Commission should 90 some way to help the proposed financial sub-committees
to see the financial conseguences not in the vacuum but in their overall
budgetarY context.
75. Furthermore the adoption of the Planning Progranming Budgetary system
(ppBs) by the comnrission, as a basis for forward estimating and programming
of possible optiong, would ease the committees' tasks in assesslng the
medium-term budget forecast and projections. Ttris system which has been in
operation in the USA for a number of years, and in France and Britain more
recently, by obltging the cotmission to produce expenditure Programmec for
3 years wlth further projections for years 4 and 5 could provide comtitteee
with a wealth of informatlon to guide their debates on policy options'
76. It must not be thought that the role of the committee on Budgets would
be diminished in any tGy by thie nee, Procedure. on the contrary, the
committee on Budgets would play a vital role in guiding Parliament a8 a
whole,initsplenarydebates,incoordinatingthebudgetaryactivitiesof
the committees as a whole and of bringing them down to earth if t'heir ideas
concerning expenditure were to become wild or unrealiEtic' Ehe Committee
on Budgets would have the crucial role of advising Parliament on the overall
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finaneial implications of the recomrnendations presented to it by the
individual Committees. Parliament would have to take its final decision
in the light of the complete budgetary context as explained to it by the
Conunittee on Budgets. Parliament as a whole and the Cotmrittee on Budgets
will, incidentally, also play an increasingly major role now that the
budget is to be defined in terms of revenue rather than expenditure as
each new proposal increasing expenditure will involve either increases
in Community revenue from its VAT or customs duties proposals or developing
new sgurces of revenue. Your Rapporteur considers, hgwever, that by
spreading the task of budgetary control over a number of Conmittees the
role of Parliament as a whole concerning both the formulation of the
Conmunity budget, partlcularly the costing of individual Conunission
proposals, and the shaping of the policy options open to the comniesion
would be greatlY inereaeed.
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vREI,ATIONS WITH IIIE COURT OF JI.'STICE, THE COURT OF
ATJDITORS, THE ECONOMIC AI{D SOCIAL COIIMITIEE AIID
REGIONAL POLICY BODIES
77. Although Parliament could develop closer relationg wlth a number of
Conununity institutions your Rapporteur has considered it practical, in this
report, to concentrate on relations with the Court of ilustice, the prospective
Court of Auditors, the Economic and Social Cotmrittee and the institutions
which are to be set up in connection with the Regional Fund.
Court of ilustice
78. Parliament does not have, in general terms, the right to seize the Court
of .Tustice directly. Whereas Article 159 of the EEC Treaty underlines the
right of the Commission, as guardian of the Treaty, to seize the Court of
Justice concerning any failure of the llember States to fulfil a Treaty
obligation, Article 173 of the EEC Treaty does not give Parliament the right
to bring actions before the Court, although this Article gives the Council,
the Commission and l.tember States the right to do so.
79. your Rapporteur proposes that a specific reference to ParliamenE be
inserted into Article 173 of the EEC Treaty (and also into Article 145 of
the Euratom Trea,ty) - in the second sentence of the first paragraph - so thal
parliament, on the same basis as a "Member State, the Council or the Comn-
ission,,, would be enabled to bring an action before the Court "on grounds of
lack of competence, infringement of an essential procedural requirernent,
infringement of this Treaty or of any rule of law relattng to its obligation,
or misuse of powers'r. Ttrus whereas the Conunission would maintain its right,
as guardian of the Treaty, to bring an action before the Court if a ltember
State has failed to fu1fil a Treaty obligation, if the Commission chooses
.G to do so Parliament shoutd have the right to do this if it considers
that such a step is justified.
80. But Parliament- has the right to seize the Court r.rr,a"r Article IZ5 of
the EEC Treaty since it is included amongst "the other institutions of the
community" whieh are able to bring an action before the court if the council
or the conuniasion fail to act in infringement of the Treaty. your Rapporteur
considerg that the wording of Article 175 of the EEC Treaty (and Article
148 of the Euratom Treaty) should be modifled, with a specific reference
to Parliament, to bring out the meaning of its first paragraph more clearly.
Your Rapporteur propoees that Parliament should exercise its ;rowera under
Article 175- Article 75 of the EEC Treaty lays down that the Council(acting unanirrcuely until the end of the second stage and by a gualified
majority thereafter) establish, on a propoeal from the Conunission and after
consulting the Economic and sociar comnittee and parriament " (a) comtnon
rules applicable to international transport to or from the territory of a
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lrlember State or passing acroga the territory of one or more Member States;
(b) ttre conditions under which non-resident carrier! may operate transport
gerviceE withln its Member states." In practice, despite the protrrcaals
submitted to it by the Comnission at an early atage, the Council hac only
established experimental rules concerning ArEicle 75(1)(a), not "comnon
rules". Further, the Council has not acted concerning Artlcle 75 (1) (b).
With respect to both these points the ConuniBsion, in ita Cormrunication on
the Development of the Conrnon Transport Po1icy (Parlianent documenb 226n31
states, in paragraph 18: "It is important to emphaaise thatby virtue of
Article 75 of the Treaty, corrnon rules applying to lnternational transport
and the conditions under which non-resident traneport undertakings may be
allowed to engage in national transport activities within a Merober State
should have been drawn up during the traneitional period." Under Article
175 Parliament should call u;rcn the Council to act with respect to
Article 75(Ll (a) and (b). lE, as laid down by Article 175 the Council has
not "defined ite posltion" on thie question within two months Parliament
ehould take a decieion to "bring an action before'the court of JuEtice"
within a further period of two months for failure of the Council to act in
"infringement" of the Treaty.
81. Your Rapporteur wishes to draw attention to the oplrcrtunity which
Parliament has of intervening in cases before the Court of Justice. This
opportunity was the subject of a Noce prepared by !{r Mentnel on behalf of
the Lega1 Conunittee for the Bureau dated 25 February L972 (PE 29.460). In
effeet the three Protocols (1) on the Statute of the Court of Justice
sEate that "ll€mber Statee and institutions of the Corununity may intervene
in cases before the Court." They go on to Etate that "submissions made
in application to intervene shalI be linited to Bupporting the submissions
of one of the partiee."
82. Thc "intcrvention" open to Parliament (or to other Coirununity
inetlEutions) is defined by Article 93 of the Rules of Prosedure of Ehc
Court of ilustice. If Parliament wished to "intervene" in the hearing of
a caBe before the Court it would first have to submit to the Court an
application to intervene in a document setting out the reasons justifying
its interest in the outcome of the case. If such an application were
accepted Parliament's role in the hearing of the caee before the Court
would be linited to supporting the application of one of the ;rarties.
In aupporting the application of a party Parliament rpuld be able to make
suggeetions about the future handling of the case by the Court. ft would
aleo be able to introduce evidence in support of a party before the Court.
(1) Protocol on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European
Coal and Steel Conununity, Protoeol on Ehe Statute of the Court of
Juetice of the European Economic Comrnunity, Protocol on the Statute
of the Court of Justice of the European Atomic Energy Community.
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83. In his Note for the Buleau l'tr Memmel suggested that Parliament should
study the possibility of intervening in cases in which it had a direct
interest. on 15 April 1972 the Bureau approved the principle of Parliament
intervening in suitable cases before the Court in which it had a direct
intereEt (see Bulletin No.8 of 28 April L972') '
84. Your Rapporteur wishes to follow up !1r Merunel's note and the decision
of the Bureau by proposing that the Legal conunittee should exanine all cases
involving the council and the commission coming before the court with a
view to recommending Parliament to intervene in those cases in whoee results
it had an interest. But since the nature and details of cases coming before
the Court of Justice are not aPParent from the brief notices printed in the
official Journal, your RaPPorteur suggests that the council and Conunission
be invitecl to inform parliament fully of all developments concerning cases
before the court to which Ehey are parties - this information should
lnclude the fomardlng to Parliament of all relevant documents.
g5. Finally, aE concernE the court, your Rapporteur wishes to touch on
the appointment of the Judges and Advocates-General. At present, urder
Article L67 of the EEC Treaty, .fudges and AdvocateE-General are "appointed
by conuron accord of the Governments of the Member states for a term of 6
years... Your Rapporteur considers that ParLiament should play an active
role in the ppointment of the Judges and Advoiates-General. To this
end he Eugge6ts that nominees of the Member states for t'hese posts should
be interviewed in the form of "hearings" by Parliament's Legal conmittee
which would then report itE views to Parliament on Ehe suitability of the
nominees., it being for Parliament as a whole to confirm or reconfirm
their appointment. 8inal appointment of ,Iudges and Advocates-General by
,,common accord.. of the Governments of the Member StaEes would take place
only after Parliament had confirmed or reconfirmed the appointments'
In this context it is interesting to note that Articie 94 of the constitition
of the Federal Republic of Germany provides for the election of half the
Irtembers of the Constitutional Court by the Bundestaq and for the election
of the other hal'f bY the 
-@1!g!'
4l PE 50 .948/fin.,/Ann. r
Ycourt of Auditors
96. Your Rapporteur wishes to recall the propoeal he nrade in hlo Opinlon
on I'tr Sp6na1e's Report of October L973 on the etrengthcning of the
budgetary poh'ers of the EuroPean Parliament (PE 33.890) in which hc
suggested that the appointment of members of the Court of Auditors (whose
creation was Euggested in the 1973 proposal from the Comrission concerning
the budget) could take the form of their being interviewed in the form of
"hearinga" by the ParliamenE's Comnitte€ on Budgeta which would then
report its views to Parliament on the suitability of the rrominees, lt
being for Parliament as a whole to confirm or recqrfirm Eheir appointment.
As your Rapporteur argued in October 1973, although the Court should be
"independent" it should not exist in a political vacuum but should report
on its operations to at least one of the institutions of ts]re Conununity.
Tti institution should, in your RaPporteur's viehr, be Parliament, which
should ercerciEe supervision over the work of the Court. As l,lr Pounder
stressed in his amendment (adopted by Parliament during its Session of
JuIy 1973) to the l,lotion for a Resolution acconrPanying lrlr Spdnale's
ReporE on the budgetary powers of the Parliament (Doc. L3L/731 the
auditors "should report to and be at all times available to assist and
advise the Parliament in the exerciae of its rights of concrol".
A7. Further, your Rapporteur considers that Parliament should have the right
to request the Court to cheek or examine expenditure wherever Parliament
considers this to be necessary. Your Rapporteur also protrroses that the
Court of Auditors should submit an annual report on its activities for debate
by Parliament. This report should not merely be a record of the Court's work
during the previous year, but should set out a programme indicating at least
some of the financial investigations it planned to carry out. during the
forthcoming year. In planning its work and investigation the Court should
take fully into account the views expressed by Parliahent, quite apart from
its being seized of specific lnvestigati-ons by Parliament.
Economic and Social Committee
88. fhe role of the Economic and Social Conunlttee is to advise the Council
in reeponse to a request for an opinion (sometimes obligatory, sometimes
optional) on the economic and social implications of Comnission proposals.
In order to avoLd duplication between the work of the Parliament and the
Economic and Social Committee and in order to provide for a more rational
system of consultation by the Council of Parliament and the Economic and
Social Committee than exists at present your Rapporteur suggests that
Parliament and the Economic and Social Comnittee should keep each other
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fully informed by exchanging draft opiniona on those mattere on which they
are both giving the Council an opinion. A further rationalisation of tle
present consultation procedure could be achieved if Parliament's Comnittees
lrere to invlte the experts of the Economic and Social Conunittee to present
their conclusione to then at public hearings organiaed by Parlianent's
Conmritteee.
eornmittee for Reoional Policv and the Funq Comlittee
89. The eEtablishment of the Regional Fund was agreed by the Heade of
coverrurent at Paris in December 1974. The introduction of a fund of
1,3OO million units of account for the years L975n7 is of rnajor
significance. The institutions responsible for operating regional policy,
and more specifically the Fund, will be the Cott4ission itself aided by
its Fund Comlittee and a conunittee concerned with more general aspects of
regional poliey, the Conunittee for Regional Pdlicy. This Conurittee is
likely to consist of 20 members, 18 being appoint,ed by tbe Member States
and two by the Commission. The Fund Conunittee is likely to be similarly
constituted, being comtrrosed of rePresentatives of !,lember States and
presided over by a rePreaentative of the ConuniEsion.
90. your Rapporteur does not consider that Parliament should intervene
etther in the appointment of, members of the two Conunittees or in the
day-tso-day adnlnlstration of the Fund, though Parliarnent will have a
meaaure of control over the money voted for the Fund and subscquently over
the expendlture of such money. Moreover the arnendment made by Parliament
to the draft decision on the creation of the Cotnmittee for Regional Policy,
which vraE accepted by the Connrittee on 15 November L973' requlring that,
,,The Contrittee ffor n"gional Policf shall report to the Council and to the
Conunission which shall inform the European Parliament on the results of its
work,' might usefully be strengthened or interpreEed so that Parliament
itself should receive an annual report on the roork of the Corunlttee for
Regional policy from the Conmission. This report would preferably take
the form of a separate printed document, which could be referred to
Parliament's Comnittee on Regional Policy and Transport in viev of an
annual debatse on regional fund expenditure. Failing this the Conmiesion's
report could takc the form of a chapter of the General RePort but your
Rapport,eur wighee to stress that the first of these alternatives le to be
preferred.
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91. An annual debate of this kind r.rould give Parliament an opPortunity to
e:q)ress ite vierys concerning not only the way in whtdr the conulission has
operated the Fund but also the way national states have cought aid from it-
parliament would thus be able to satisfy iteelf thbt aid had both been sought
and given in the 1lght of Article 92 of the EEC Treaty and in accordance
with the preamble to the EEC Treaty which seekg "to enlure thetr lEhe
peoples of eutopgf harmonlous development by reduclng the differenees
extating between the varloua regiona and the badsardneec of the less
favoured regiona- t'
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EXTERIIAL REIATIONS (1)
gZ. ltlr van der Goeg van Naters gtressed the importance of the Parliarrent's
t,aking part in the eonclusion of trade agreements with third countries '
ae early aB ilanuary 1965 (21 . Your Rapporteur is thus by no means the
first member of the Parlianpnt to raise this point. He has, nonetheless,
certain new proposals to put forward and hopes that these will be
consistent with the views which t{r. Thomsen is due to er(Press on the
Comrunity's role in the negotiation of association, and conmercial and
co-operagion agreements in his capacity as Rapporteur of the Committee
on External Economic Relations. ltr. Tlromsen witl aIEo examine bilateral
',co-operation agreementg" by which Meniber SEateg offer lndustrial or
tsechnical assistance in exchange for t,rade thus evading both Article 113
of the EEC Treaty and an Opinion of the Parliament. Your RaPPorteur does
not wish to duplicate l.lr. Ttromsen's work in this important area (3).
Association Agreements
93. Article 238 of the Elc Treaty states that association agreer'e nts
rshall be concluded by the Council, acting unanimously after consulting
the Acsemblyr. In your Rapporteur'8 view the problems that arige for
parliarmnt concerning the negotiation of association agreementg are:
(a) how ehould it be informed?
(b) hou rhould it be consulted?
(c) can it in any way "ratify' euch agreements?
94. Until now Parliament, in trying to increasc iEs role in the
negotiation of association asrreements, has tended to concenurate on
obtaining information from the Commission and Council rather than on
seeing how it could more fully be consulted or how it could play some
part in ,,ratification'. Ttris attitude has also characterised
Your Rapporteur is indebted, for much of the factual information
in thie chapter, +-o the llemorandum prepared by the Directorate-
General of Conunitteee and Inter-Parliamentary Delegations for
meniberE of the External Economic Relations Committee on "Procedurefor participation by the European Parliament in the conclusion
of tiade agreemente between the Comrnunity and ttrird Countries'.(DB 74.843, 15.Xr.1973)
Report prepared on behalf of the Political Affairs Conanitt€e,
Document ll9 of 11 JanuarY L965.
Instances Of bilateral "co-operation agreements" include France-Iraq,
France-Iran, United Kinqdom-Iran agreGmcntr and a numbcr of agrcements
bctween ttenrbcr Statcs rnd Eaetorn European countries.
(1)
(21
(3)
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Parliament's attitude concerning the negotiation of trade and co-operation
agreements with third countriee. Thus the report drarryn up on behalf of
the Political Affairs Committee by l{r. Giraudo on procedures for participa-
tion by the European Parliament in the conclusion of trade agreements
between the Conununity and third countries (document 3OO/?21 led to Parliament's
ReEolution which informed the Council of Parliament's wigh for its
responsible comnittees to receive relevant information before trade agree-
ments are signed.
95. The syEten by whiclt Lho Parliarx:rrh at prosonl purticlpatou in the
negoEiation of association agreements is knorrn as the rLun! procedure"
after the forrpr Netherlands ltlinister for Foreign Affairs who was President-
in-Office of the Council when this procedure was introduced. Under the
"Luns procedure" (1) Parlianent is informed, through its responsible
parliamentary conrmittees :
(a) by the Comnission concerning the evolution of negotiationE, and
(b) by the Council, when substantive negotiations have ended but
before the signing of the association treaty.
96. Ttre information given to Parliament's conunittees is confidential in
charactser. Ttre "Luns procedure" does not replace the offi.cial consultation
of the Parliament by the Council which takes place after the signature
of the association treaty and before the deposit of the instruments of
rat ification (2) .
Trade Aqreements
97. Since members of the Parliament considered that some sirnilar
procedure should be devised so as to permit its responsible committees to
be informed of the progrees of trade and co-operation agreements (3),
pressures in this sense led to the Council agreeing to the "Westerterp
procedure" which was used for the first time when Parliamerrt's responsible
committee was informed of the content of the EEC-Egypt trade agreement at
the time of its conclusion. However !.1r. Giraudo, in his report of
Whose introduction was probably due to the position Parliament
adopted in ite Resolution of 27 June 1963 based on the Report
eubmitted by !,!r Purler on its competences and porrers.
Thip procedure has been criticized by Parliament on a number
of occasions on the grounds that the timing of the information
'given to Parliament's conunit,tees ie usually too late for Parliament's
Opinion to be adequately conaidered in drawing up the AEsociation
Agreement.
trlhoee negotiation, under Article II3 of the EEC Treaty do not
necessarilv involve consultation of the Parliament by tshe Council.
(1)
t2)
(3)
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February L973, stressed bhat the "Westerterp procedure" was inadequate since
Parliament wished to be informed through its relevant Committees before
trade agreements are signed. Further, there has been some feeling in
Parliament that since entry into force of the common commercial policy on
I .Ianuary 1973 the "Luns procedure" should be replaced by some new system
in which ParLiament is more closely involved in the Council's decisions when
trade negotiations are conducted with third countries.
98. In liglt of Parliament'g views the President-in-office of the Council
proposed to Parliament on 17 October 1973 (further to the.Resolution adopted
by Parliament on 13 February 1973 on the basis of !lr. Giraudo's report) that,
it should play a more active role in the sphere of trade agreements.
Parliament's participation could, in ttre view of the PresidenE-in-Office of
the Council, be envisaged in the following manner (I):
- 
before negotiations st,art on a trade agreement with a third
counEry and in tl,e light of information provided by';he Council
to the responsible parliamentary committees, a debate may, in
appropriate cases, be held in the Housei
- 
at the end of the negotiations, before the agreement is signed,
the President of the Council or its representative sha-1l inform
confidentially and unofficially the responsible parliamentary
corunittees of the substance of the agreement;
- 
bearing in mind the interest which the European Parliament has
in trade agreements to be signed by the Community, the Council
shaIl, after the signature of such agreements, and before their
conclusion, inform Parliament of their strbstance.
gg- Your Rapporteur notes that apart from the first of these three
proposals made by the President-in-Office of the Council on 17 October 1973
aIl actual or proposed arrangement,s concerning the participation of the
Parliament in both association and trade agreements are limited to
informinq the Parliament of progress made by the Commission in the course
of negotiations or, by the Council, of the results of the negotiations
when these have been substantively concluded.
(f) See Council's note to the European Parliament on the improvement
of relations between the Council and the European Parliament
dated 16 October L973 and published in the Bulletin of 19 October
L973 (no. 74/73).
- 
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A New Procedure
roo- Your Rapporteur considers that information is not enough. He berieves
that a more genuine form of 'consultat,ion" and some form of "ratification,,
are required- Irr consequence he proposes the procedure set out belor to
apPly both to asscciation ard trade agreements. Firat, before the council
establishes the commission'e mandate to negotiate and in the light, of
information given by the council to the responsible parliamcntary comnitt,ees
an orientation d€bate could be held by the parliament (thus taking up the
firet euggestion of the President-in-office of the council of L7 october
1973 not onry the context of trade agreements but arso in that of
association alJr€ements). Ttre council should then determine the cotmlission,s
mandate in the light of the viewa expressed in the orientation debate held
by Parliament.
1o1' rotlowing this, the Conmission should continue the present procedure of
informing, confidentially and unofficially, the rerponsible parliamcntary
conmittees of the evolution of negotiations and of the najor problems to be
overcome- Your Rapporteur f,ully realiseg that it ia not desirable to hold a
public debate durinq the course of neqotiationr condueted by the comlccion
rlnce this would revcal thc conununity's ncaotlttlng poeltlon and bargaining
counterg.
1o2. Your RaPPorteur next wiEhes to propose a radical tran...formation of the
preeent procedure. Instead of adopting the third suggestion made by the
President-in-office of the Council on 17 october 1973 by which the Council
would after the signature of trade agreements and before their conclusion
inform Parliament of their substance, your Rapporteur suggests that both
for aseociation and trad,e agreemente a significant distinction shouLd be
made between the "initialling" of agreements 
- which couid best, perhaps,
be done by the Conunission, on the side of the Community, in its capacity as
negotiator 
- and the "signature' of association and trade agreements by the
Counc i1.
lo3. Between the "initiarring' and the ,,signature,, of agreements a
"ratification" stage should be introduced, which, on the side of the
community, shourd involve e fulr debate in parliament of the terms
negotiated by the conunisEion on behalf of the community. only when
Parliament has approved the terms negotiated would the Council be able to
proceed to the amendment or the "signature" of association and trade
agreements. Such an innovation could increase substantially the role
played by the Parliament in the negotiation of both aasociation and trade
agreementB. Although Parliament would not be able to modify the course of
negotiations throuqh public debate it would be able both to inject its views
concerning association and trade agreements into negotiations by means of
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the initial orientation debate and, Iater it would then be in a position
to ratify the draft treaty initialled by the Connnission before thiE waa
signed by the council and to influence any amendments to the draft
agreements made by the Council. Parliament would also have the power to
reject terms negotiated by the comrnission under the mandate given to it
by the Council by refuaing to Proceed to the "ratificationi debate'
Ttre need for a ,,ratification" procedure involving Parliarnent is eapecially
great in view of the fact that agsociation, corunercial and co-operation
agreements are essentially Acts with financial consequenc€g. It ie
nocoasary for Parliamont to know what the financial conseguonces of these
Actsare(eepeclallyglneetheintroductionofthenewCommunity
budgetary system in 1975) before they are approved by the council.
1o4. I'he new Procedure suggested by your Rapporteur would have the
advantage of providing sOme form of democratic control over the establish-
ment of association,. and trade and co-operation agreements' Lhich have
both political and economic implicationE of great significance, in a
situation in which national parliaments have no direct control over the
actione of the council and the conunission and in which the European
Parliament, until now, has played an ineufficient role' llhis procedure
might aleo be used (suitably adapted to the epecific requirements of the
lndividual negotiation) with reapect to other internatlonal negotirtions
in whlch the corununit,y takes Part such as GATT tariff negotiations ' or in
which the Joint lnteresta of the Nlne are lnvolved '
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VII
SCOPE FOR PARLIAITTENTARY CONTROL
European Union
lO5. At the paris rlreeting of Heads of State or of Government of October
Lg72 iE was decided that by 1980, at the lategt, the Nine would create a
,.European Union" involving the transformation of the whole conplex of
relations between the lteniber States. Parliament, in its General Report
on the Sixth RePort of the Commission of the Europeerr Conmunities
(Rapporteur ltr Seefeld) has set out its viehr "thaL a verltable European
Union . .. cannot be restricted solely to the economic and gocial fielde
but must include measures of polit,ical cooperation and cannot leave out
of account measures of defence cooperation". Your Rapporteur considers
this point of rriew to be highly significant with regard to the nature of
the "European Union" to be achieved by 1980. A "European Union' which
does not include foreign policy and defence would be a mockery.
1o5. A8, then, the Nine develop machinery for cooperation in foreign
policy and, poesibly, defence (within the framework of "European Union"
or preparatory to its creation) Parliament must, Etep by steP, ensure
that this machinery, and thoge who control it, are accountable to the
European Parliament. Parliament should, in your Rapporteur's view,
play a buccaneerinq role in latching on to all developmenLs directly
involving the Nine in foreign policy and defence so as to ensure that
sone degree of parliamentary control is established over these moves,
and that, even if at present they take place outside the Community framework,
there are some linkE with the Community.
1O7. your Rapporteur doea not consider it to be useful for him to coment
further on European Union in view of l,tr Bertrand's forthcoming report
on that theme.
Foreicrn Policv
1O. In foreign policy a Etart has already been made. At Ttre Hague
Eurunit of December 1969 the Heads of State or Government instructed the
Poreign Ministers to "study the best way of achieving progress in the
matter of political unification within the context of enlargement". your
Rapporteur does not need to recapit,ulate here the development, from 1971,
of poliLic.tI cooporation beLhreen thc Foreign l.tiniaters of the Nine with
the aid of the Po1itical Committee composed of the Directors of political
Affairs of their Foreign l,tinistries.
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1O9. This process of political cooperatlon has yielded both succesaeg and
failures. But whether the political cooperation process is more or lesa i
guccessful concerning a single issue is leEs important than that it hae
already proved to be a useful, even essential, feature of relations between
the Nine. Politieal cooperation between the Nine has not, however, in the
paet been carried out within Community instit.utions but on a purely
intergovernmental basis - the Political Conunittee and the Foreign tliniaters
meeting as "parallel" institutions and not as community organs. Both
Mr Seefeld in hlg General Report, and l,tr llo.unersteeg in a recent report
for the Political Affairs Cotmittee on European political cooperation and
unification (tbc.L2n3) have already drawn attention to this problem.
parliament has already become involved in the polit,ical cooperation process
since reports have been made regrularly to the Politica1 Affairs Conunittee
of Parliament by the Foreign llinisters after their original twice yearly
meetings and their present four annual meetings. the reports of the
Foreign Ministers take the form of a colloguy wiEh the Political Affairs
Comnittee at which the Governmente are represented by Foreign Affairs
Minitere and,/or genior officiale (1). Further, your Rapporteur notee that
the involvement of Parliament in political cooperation ehould increase
following the decieion taken by the Paris Surunit of Decernber L974 by which
che President of the Council wiIl, in future, be authorieed to reply to
queetsions tabled in Parliament concerning political cooperation - as
members of Parliament have urged in the paet.
IlO. The Second Report on Political Cooperation of September 1973 proposed
that the rhythm of political cooperation should be intensified and that the
Foreign tilinisters should meet four times a year. It has been agreed that,
colloquies between the Eoreign l,tinisters and the Political Affairs Committee
of Parliament should be held immediately following each of, the four
Ministerial meetings. The report states that the colloguies, coupled with
Lhc Re1>ort of Ehe Preeident of the Council to Parliament's Plenary Session
[.rve "put into effoct the dosiro of tho Foreign Ministers to make a
conCribution Lo the democraEic character of Ehe consEruction of a political
uniont
(I) It should be noted that the Commission is asked to give the
Foreign Ministers its opinion when the questions discussed are
relevant to Treaty comPetences.
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I1I. parllament'a involvement in the poliElcal cooperation process could
ba lncreaaed if Parllament were to follow up the suggeotion made in the
Second Report on Political Cooperat,ion that the Polrtlcal Cotnmittee "will
draw to the at,tentlon of l,tinisters propoeale adopted by the European
parliament on foreign policy questions." The Polrtical Affaire Comnittec
ahould, then, in your RaPPorteur's view, gubmit formal suggest,ions for
approval by Partiament as a whole as to questlons which could be placed on
the agenda of the Foreign Minieters of the Nine. Parllament should also
ingist that a printed report be submitted by the Council to Parliament
each year on trrclitical cooperation, which would proviile the basis for a
fulI scale debate in which Foreign MlnisEers could participate.
112. At this point your Rapporteur wishes to make a more general corunent.
Although it is true that national parliaments will probably try to retain
their own re6ponstbility for national foreign policy to the greateat extent
possible, it should be noted that national parliaments have already tacitly
allowed international asseniblies whose prime concelnB are international
affairs and security - and here your Rapporteur has the Council of Europe,
t{EU and North Atlantic Aesemblies in mind - to take over the major practical
responsibility for parliarentary discuEsion of at least European and
Atlantic security questions. Thla suggcatc that whereas purely national
foreign policy competences are likely to be retained by national parliaments
so long as individual governments continue to conduct individual national
foreign policies, international parliamentary bodies are already, d,e facto,
the moet conq)etent bodies to discuss and influence the degree of foreign
policy that its within the competence of international organisations. If
this is true of the Consultative Assembly, the North Atlantic Assembly and
the WEU Assembly with respect to the work of the Council of Europe, NATO
and of V|EU, these classical intergovernmental organisationg, it nust to an
even greater extent be true of the Conununity parliamentary body, the
European Parliament.
Il3. If it is important for the present'parallel" process of political
cooperat,ion to be linked as closely as possible to Parliament and for
those in charge of political cooperation to be made respongible to
Parliament, it will be even more essential for any Political Secretariat
that may be established in the future to be responsible to Parliament for
ite activities.
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II4. Therc has been a revival of lntere8t ln the establtsh:nent of a
polltlcal Secrotarlat, poselbly along the llnea of the French Government's
thro aets of "Fouchet proposalg" of 1961 and 1952 and of the Alternative
Draft Treaty of the Five. If this Proves to be the case Pa;lianent should
insist on being consultecl concerning the establiEhment of a Political
secretariat and shculd algo insiEt that the council be accountable to
parllament for ita work and activitles with the Preeident of the conference
of Foreign ttintster8 appearlng not only in cloeed session before the
parliament'e Political Affairs Comnittee but aleo keeping Parlianent fully
informed of politrcal cooperation developments in Plenary Seseion and
replying to questions in Public.
11S. Quite apart from establishing links with the political cooperation Process
parliament has an autonomous right to debate foreign policy if it so wishes'
The tradition of .,initiative rePorts" is a firmly established one and your
RaPporteurcanpointtothepreparationofreportsontheConference
on Security and Cooperation in Europe andon the Mutual and Palanced Force
Reduction negotiations in the Po]itica} Affairs Comnittee as topical instances
of such report,s. on its side the commiesion has stated that it "would ' "
wglcome it if Parliament's voice could increasingly be heard on broad
political issues of topical interest. In cooPeration with the Bureau of
parliament, the commission is ready to contribute its share to the holding
of such political debates. Ttrese will enable Parliamen! to define the
general political approach to be adopted. " (1) should the right of the
parliament to debate such matters be challenged it is only necessary to
recall, as justification of foreign affairs discussions, Paragraph 3 (b) of
the Bonn Declaration of 18 JuIy 1961 in which the Heads of state or
covernment decided (in the specific context of developing political
cooperation):,,?oassociatepublicopinionmorecloselywiththeefforts
already undertaken bir inciting the European Parliament to extend the range
of its debates to new fields with the cooperation of the Governments"' This
right has been recognised by the Council as ig shownr for instance, by the reply
made by the RepresenEative of the council to oral questions with debate
Nos.lOI,/73andL3a/T3onEheConferenceonSecurityandCooperationin
Europe and relations with the USA on 15 ilanuary L974'
(I) Communication from the cotilnission on practical measures to strengthen
thelrcwergofconEroloftheParliamentandtoimproverelatlons
between the Parliament and the ComrissLon (PE 33'489)'
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lI5. y6ur RaPPorte\lr hrishet Lo give an examplo ot clle way irr wlrich.rn
I'initiative report" on one specific subject could be of great use to the
Community as a whole. The Western countries are engaged in a nurnber of
complex but separate negotiations with the states of Eastern Europe 
- for
instance, the SALT talks, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe and the Mutual and Balanced E'orce Reductions rregotiations. At the
same time the countries of Eastern Europe are showing signs of interest
about engaging in cloeer dialogue with the Conununity and of possibly
wishing to open trade negotiations with it. Whereas the Western
negotiating positions are split up between a number of different instit,ut-
ions in which dif,ferent Western countries take part, Eastern positions are
carefully co-ordinated and prepared. If the Commun:.ty is to be able to
judge how the guestion of trade relations between the EEe and Comecon fits
into the overall pattern of East-West relations it is essential that some
hard thinking be earried out about the relationship between East-West
commercial ralations ard East-west political and military relations. Neither
the council nor the conunission are at present able to do this, but
Parliament, through an "initiative report,,, courd do so, your Rapporteur,
for one, would consider an initiative in this sense to be of great value
to the community as a whole and to other alried western countries.
117. Your RaPPorteur is aware that if Parliament, continues to develop
an active interest in foreign affairs this might provoke crlticisms from
the European and Atlantic international parliamentary bodies which have
traditionally concerned themselves with these questions. But in your
Rapporteur's view it is clear that the European parliament should be the
parliamentary forum in which alr aspects of the work of the Nine 
- both
within and outside a st,rictry community framework 
- should be examined and
debated. This consideration is particularly significant in moving towards
"European union" and should be the over-riding conslderation in justifying
Parriament's widening of its scope for parriament,ary contror.
Defence Cooperation
118' wtrereas the links between the Foreign Minist.ers and parliament,s
Political Affairs committee and Parliament's participation in association
and trade agreements through the "Luns" and "westerterp., procedures havegiven the European parliament a foothord in the earry stages of the
development of a cotnmon foreign policy by the Nine, no comparable situation
exists with respect to defence cooperation. Ttris is mainry due t,o the
simple fact that the Nine have not, yet acted aB an entity in European
defence cooperation.
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I19. Noneb5eIeSs, as sErcssecl carl i.cr, a "Europcatl Union" must- JOgiCally
include defence within its scope. Further, paragraph 8 of Ehe European
Identity Paper agreed at the Copenhagen Sumrnit of 14 December 1973 st'ated:
,,The Nine, one of whoee essential aims is to maintain Peace, will never
succeed in doing so if they neglect their own security. " So long as
European defence cooperation continues to develop oulside a Community
framework or outside 'parallel" cooperation by the Nine, parllament'ary
supervieion can be left to the l{EU and North Atlantic AsseilblieE. If and
when,however,theNinecreatesomeformofEuropeandefenceentitythe
European Parliament must be ready and able to develop parlianentary control
over its work in a similar manner to the way in which it has started to
develop parliamentary control over the political cooperation Process.
l2o.InyourRapPorteur.sviewitwouldbepreferableforthescopeand
eom;retences of the Nine in both the political' and defence cooperation
fields to be laid down in new treaties, in which the institutional role
and responsibilities of Parliament would be formally spel-Ied out in detail'
If, however, political and defence cooperation develop as "parallel"
activities it will be for Parliament itself to stake out its role in
conErolling cooPeration in these two fields'
Economic and MonetarE-.Union
121. Finally, it may be useful to examine how Parliament might fit into
the development of economic and monetary union. During the inevitably
progressive convergence of economic policies over time it is hoped that
the fundamental relationship between Parliament and the Comrnission con-
cerning economic policy will gradually change in the sense of the Resolution
adopted by the Council and the Representatives of the Governments 'of the
Member States on 22 l,tarch 1971, of which paragraph 4 of clause 3 stated:
"The Community policies implemented within the framework of economic and
monetary union shall be subject to discussion and control of the
European ParIiament. "
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122. The 'TVerner Report" of 1969 on which the resolution was based suggested
a different line of approach since it proposed that there should be set
up a "centre of decision for economic poliry" to "exercise independently,
in accordance with the Community interest, a decisive influence over the
economic policy of the Community. " According to the "Werner Report"
this "centre of decision for economic policy wilI be politicatly responsible
to a European Parliament. Ttre latter will have a statue corresponding to
Ehc exLensi.on of the Community's taeks, not only from the point of view of
the extenE of its power but also havitrg regard to the method of election of
its members. " Your Rapporteur wishes to reject, at least as far as he
himself is concerned, any notion that this "centre of decision for economic
policy" could lce anything other than the Comruission.
123. Parliament's resolution of December 1970 on the "Werner Report"
emphasised that "any transfer of powers in economic anl monetary matters
from the national authorities to the Community must be accompanied, to
ensure democratic control, by an increase in the powers of the European
Parliament. " Since, however, the prospects are for only a gradual
movement towards economic and monetary union the proposals nade in the
resolution of the Council and the tlember Governments and in the "Werner
Report" may need to be reassessed in the light of changing circumstances
and attitudes towards economic and monelary union.
124, Your Rap;rcrteur realizes that apart from political cooperation, defence
cooperation and economic and monetary union, there are a number of other
new fields over which Parliament could appropriately try to develop a
degree of control. But in the present, chapter your Rapport,eur has
considered it impractical to go beyond these three subjects.
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VIII
CONCLUSIONS AND SU!,I'IARY
L25. Since your napporteur has eovered a great deal of complicated subject
matter in this report it may be useful for him to sumarise briefly, in
this chapter, the main conclusions drawn in the separate ehapters of the
Report.
126. Your RapporCeur wishes to emphasise, once again, thet Parliament
will never play an entirely satisfactory role within the Commrrnity
framework until it is possible for it to develop a real degree of control
over the Council's activities. Some of the protrrcsals which are suilnarised
in this chapter reflect this aim. But in the short-term Parliament must
also try to help re-establish the Corunission's poli-tical. influence and
initiative, which would, in turn, give greater reality and significance
to Parlianent's "supervision" or "control" of the CommiEsion.
Decision-makinq and Parliarnent
127. fn Chapter fI your Rapporteur analyses the "Luxembourg agreement,,
and makes proposals concerning:
(a) Sununit meetings (paragrapha 17, 18 and 19)
(b) Reeolutions (paragraph 23 ).
128. Your Rapporteur dravrs attention in Chapter fI to the possibilities
that exist to define policies in new fields, within ttre acope of the Treaties
of Rome and Paris by using Article 235 of the EEC Treaty (paragraphs 27 and
281.
129. Your Rapporteur also ProPoses in this Chapter, that the new method of
decision-making he outlined in his Opinion on Mr Sp6nale,s Report on
strengthening the budgetary powers of Parliament (PE 33.89O) of October
1973, and whieh is already, as far as the concertatior. procedure is
concerned, being applied by Parliament and Council, be applied not only
t,o proposals for Acts with financial implications but for all legislation
proposals. The introduction of this system would probably require Treaty
ehanges in Article 236 of the EEC Treaty. (paragraphs 31-33). Additionally,
your Rapporteur proposed that Parliament should exercise a power of
initi.ative, concerning legislation, analogous to "Private lulember6___Ei_ll€',
(paragraph 3O).
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13O. In Chapter III your RaPPorteur suggests ways in which Parliament's
main instrument of control over the Commission, the motion of censure,
might become a more flexible and sophisticated ld€apon (paragraphE 38-401
and discusseE ways in which Parliament might participate in the appointment
of members of the Conunission (paragraphs 41-43 ) '
I31. Your Rapporteur emphasises the
"hearings" as a regular practice on
(parac-Jraphs 44-48). Itc comments on
and the Eabling of questions Eo Ehe
importance of developing public
the part of ParliamenE's Committeee
Lhe General Report (paragraphs 49-51 )
Commiesion (paragraPh 52 ) .
132. your Rapporteur stresses that Parliament should seek tc establish a
much closer relationship with the Council, and exPresses the hope that the
Council might agree to accept majority voting for most decisions which
would give meaning to the Corunission's power of initiative and significance
to Parliament's relationship with the Conunission (paragraphs 54-56)'
133. your Rapporteur expresaee the hope that the Council might become
involved in "lrearings" held by Parliament (paragraph 57) and also suggests
thdt the president of the Council should agree to receive the President of
the parliament whenever the latter is requested by Parliament to Present
his vlews on a particular guestion (paragraph 58) '
Budoetarv Control
I34. tn Chapter IV your RapporEeur tlcvelops Llre 1>roposal Llrat Par liamcnt 's
Conunittees should establish Sub-committees responsible for examining, il't
detail, the budgetary implications of all proposals of the Commission
within their parent Comnittees' fields of competence. The function of
the budgetary Sub-committees would be two-fold. First, they would be
expected to examine all the financial details of proposals for Acts with
financial implications. second, they would advise their parent
Comrittees concerning the nedium-term development of the Commission's
policies within the relevant sector. In view of the work of the budgetary
Sub-committeeE, parent Comnittees should be able to assegs and influence
the major policy optlons open to the Commission in the relevant sector.
Ttre budgetary Sub-conunittee should make use of public "hearings" l*herever
appropriate in their work (paragraphs 59-721 '
135. your Rapporteur auggeste that the committee on Budgets should give a
second opinion on Ehe budgetary impticaEions of alt proposals of thc
Commission for an Act with financial implications at a late stage in the
deliberations of the competent committees (paragraoh 73).
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136. your Rapporteur suggests that the Commission should provide, each
year, a five-year projection of its budget so that Parliament's Committees
can assess how far planned expenditure corresponds with political options
and priorities in their fields (paragrapte 74-75) -
Relations with the court of Justice, the Court of Auditors, the Economic
and Social Corunittee and Reqional Policv Bodies
137. As regards the Court of Justice, your RaPPorteur ProPoses that a
specific referenu-e to Parliament be inserted into Article 173 of the EEC
Treaty to enable Parliament to bring an action before the Court - within
the context of Article 173 - on the same basis as a Member State, the
Council or the Conmission (paragraphs 78-79). He also Proposes a
re-wording of Article 174 of the EEC Treaty (Article 148 of the Euratom
Treaty) (paragraPh 80).
138. your Rapporteur draws attention to the opportunity which Parliament
has of intervening in cases before the Court of Justice and recommends
parliament to intervene in those cases in whose results it has an interest.
(Paragraphs 81-84).
139. your Rapporteur proposes that the nominees of llember States for the
positions of Judges and Advocates-Genera1 should be interviewed in the
form of "lnearings" by Parliament's Legal Committee, it being for Parliament
as a wholc Eo confirm or re-confirnr Lhat appointment, before their final
appointmenE by "common accord" of thc Governments of Ehe Member States
(paragraph 85 ) .
I4O. As concerns the Court of Auditors, your Rapporteur makes suggestions
concerning the appointment of lrlembers of the proposed Cotrt, and outlines
ways in which the Court should be accountable for its oPerations to
Parliament (paragraphs 86-87 ).
141. your Rapporteur suggests a systematic exchange of draft opinions
between Parliament's Committees and the Economic and Social Cornmittee
concerning matters on which both bodies have to give the Council an
opinion. He also suggests that experts of the Economic and Social Committee
should inform Parriament's committees of their findings' concerning
questions on which both Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee
are dne to give opinions to the Council, at public "hearings" arranged by
Parliament's Committees. (paragraph 88 ) .
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142. As regards tshe Corunittee for Regional Policy and the Furrd Comrnittec'
which it is hoped will be established in the near future, ),our Rapporteur
suggests that the Committee for Regional Policy should report directly to
the European Parliament, as well as to the Council and to the Commission,
on the results of its work in view of an annual debate on regional fund
expenditure (paragraPhs 89-91).
External Relationg
143. Your Rapporteur ProPoses,in Chapter VI, a new procedure to apply both
to association and trade and cooperation agreements, which would include an
',orient,ation" debate in Parliament before the Council gives the Commission
a mandate, and also the introduction of a "ratification" stage (paragraphs
e2-Lo4l .
Scope for ParliamentarY Control
L44. rn Chapter VII your Rapporteur stresses that a meaningful "European
Union', must include foreign policy and defence Ernd he points to the need
for Parliament to ensure that as the Nine develop foreign policy and
possib1y defence cooperation machinery Parliament must, step by step,
ensure that this is accountable to itself (paragraphs 1o5-1o5).
I45. As far as the political cooperation procea9 is concerned your
Rapporteur considers that Parliament should hold an annual debate on
political cooperation on the basis of a printed report submitted by the
Council (paragraphs 1O8-1IO). Further, your Rapporteur suggests that
Parliament increase its involvement in political cooperation by following
up the proposal made in the Second Report on Political Cooperation that
Parliament might make suggestions as to questions which could suitably
bc considercd by the Foreign Ministers of the Nine (paragraph 111 ) .
146. Your Rapporteur stresses the right of Parliament to devote "initiativt.
reports" to foreign policy issues (paragraph 115).
L47. Your Rapporteur points to the nccd for Parliamc.nt Eo develop control
over any European defence entity that may be ereated at the level of thc
Nlne (paragraphe 118-12O).
148. Finally, your Rapporteur examines how Parliament might fit into the
development of economic and monetary union (paragraphs 121-123 ) .
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